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The wound is the place where the Light enters you.  
          – Rumi  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
150,000 human beings slaughtered; 200,000 women raped; thousands of 
limbs amputated; countless children forced to kill their own parents, forced 
into sexual slavery, and forced into the battlefields; and 2.6 million persons 
displaced.1  These are just some of the gruesome realities of an unforgiving 
war that consumed Sierra Leone for more than ten years.  There is another 
number of significance: Nine.  That is the number of individuals held 
criminally responsible for these atrocities.2 
After ten years and spending an estimated $250 million dollars,3 the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) convicted and sentenced just nine 
men.  With all trial and appeals at the SCSL now complete,4 we are afforded 
an opportunity to evaluate its legacy.  While commentators have reviewed the 
work of the SCSL from a variety of perspectives, the vantage point provided 
from an examination of its sentencing legacy has been largely ignored.5  The 
                                                                                                                   
 1 The war caused 12% of Sierra Leone’s population to flee to neighboring countries and 
rendered homeless more than half of those that remained.  See MARY KALDOR & JAMES 
VINCENT, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, CASE STUDY: SIERRA LEONE (2006); see 
also TIM KELSALL, CULTURE UNDER CROSS-EXAMINATION: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE 
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 29 (2009) (discussing mutilations, decapitations, 
immolations, physical and sexual humiliation, sexual slavery and limb amputation); IAN 
SMILLIE ET AL., THE HEART OF THE MATTER: SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS & HUMAN SECURITY 9 
(2000) (discussing the devastating nature of the conflict); Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, 
Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 394 (2001) (discussing a campaign of terror against civilians that 
included abducting children, forced prostitution, and the amputation of limbs); JOHN L. 
HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 14–15 (2001) 
(discussing the “relentless terror, loss of life, and indiscriminate amputations” that colored the 
conflict); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice and The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’s War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 55, 71 (2003) (discussing the psychological 
effects that accompany the brutal nature of the conflict). 
 2 Charles Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
395 (2011) (arguing that “the limited number of persons” prosecuted is a “serious 
shortcoming” of the Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
 3 Stuart Ford, How Leadership in International Criminal Law is Shifting from the United 
States to Europe and Asia, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 953, 975 (2011). 
 4 THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, ABOUT, http://www.sc-sl.org/ABOUT/tabid/70/ 
Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  
 5 While research and scholarship on ICL continues to proliferate, the law of punishment 
and sentencing in ICL still receives scant treatment in law review articles, books, and treatises.  
Even legacy projects specific to the SCSL largely ignore systematic and rigorous treatment of 
the SCSL’s sentencing jurisprudence.  When one considers that a perpetrator’s punishment is 
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SCSL’s legacy includes a rich and potent sentencing jurisprudence that can 
reshape and stabilize punishment and sentencing in international criminal 
law (ICL). This Article seeks to uncover these gems from the SCSL’s 
sentencing jurisprudence.  In doing so, it demonstrates the enduring 
relevance of this body of law to ICL generally and to the work of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in particular.6   
This Article also makes additional contributions to the development of 
international criminal law.  It provides a comprehensive critique of all 
sentencing judgments of the SCSL.  In addition to synthesizing the 
sentencing jurisprudence, this Article also identifies the SCSL’s key 
contributions to the substantive law of ICL, provides a normative assessment 
of the jurisprudence, and links judicial narratives to social narratives about 
war, atrocities, crimes, and accountability. 
The choice to focus on the SCSL was encouraged by four milestones in 
ICL.  First, the SCSL is the first United Nations sponsored international 
tribunal to indict, convict, and sentence a sitting Head of State for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.7 The indictment of Liberian President 
Charles Taylor, while he was a sitting Head of State for crimes committed 
as a Head of State, signals an inevitable eventual sunset on an international 
order founded on Westpahlia’s contradictory and fallacious framework.  
Second, the SCSL has completed all trials and appeals proceedings in its 
four major cases.  All defendants have been sentenced and all have 
exhausted their appeals.8  Third, the completion of the work of the SCSL 
has spurred a proliferation of legacy scholarship examining many aspects 
of the court’s work, but the court’s sentencing jurisprudence remains 
largely under-examined.9  Finally, the ICC’s seminal sentencing judgment 
turns to the SCSL’s sentencing jurisprudence, signaling the importance and 
                                                                                                                   
integral to building a culture of accountability, the neglect of sentencing is surprising, 
although not without explanation.  See Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing 
Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 857, 857–58 (2009). 
 6 See also Vincent O. Nmehielle & Charles C. Jalloh, The Legacy of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 107 (2006). 
 7 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing Judgment (Spec. Ct. Sierra 
Leone, May 30, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Sentencing Judgment].  
 8 Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Oral Hearings Conclude in Taylor Appeal, 
Judges Will Now Retire to Deliberate and Consider Judgment (Jan. 23, 2013). 
 9 E.g., THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2013).  But see Margaret M. 
deGuzman, The Sentencing Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA 
LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY, supra, at 373–94.  
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continuing relevance of the body of law and international jurisprudence 
analyzed herein. 
Part II offers a brief background to Sierra Leona’s decade-long war.  Part 
III provides a legal analysis of the four trials and their sentencing judgments.  
Part IV discusses the SCSL’s sentencing legacy from multiple perspectives.  
First, it thematically systematizes the sentencing jurisprudence, drawing out 
key contributions of the SCSL to ICL sentencing law.  This section also 
criticizes some shortcomings and missed opportunities regarding its rulings 
and sentencing practice. 
Part V develops descriptive claims and normative assessments regarding 
the SCSL’s sentencing legacy, including linking the sentencing discourse to 
broader social narratives about justice, culpability, the conflict, just war, and 
legitimacy.  I argue that the judges at the SCSL have adopted a punitive model 
for international criminal justice and that this reorientation is a positive 
development.  I also criticize the court’s failure to develop a sentencing 
framework capable of implementing the punitive model.  The Article 
concludes by introducing the reader to an original theory and preliminary 
consideration towards constructing a new framework for ICL sentencing and 
punishment.  I argue that perpetrators who enable a situation or environment 
that encourages or sustains widespread criminality deserve greater punishment 
even if their mode of liability falls short of direct commission of the crimes.  
For the time being, I call this theory “enabler responsibility.”10   
II.  BACKGROUND: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND BLANKET AMNESTIES FAIL TO 
STOP CONFLICT OR ATROCITIES  
In Sierra Leone’s 1996 democratic elections, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 
an ethnic Mandingo, was elected President of Sierra Leone, becoming the 
country’s first Muslim Head of State.11  Although the people of Sierra Leone 
                                                                                                                   
 10 It may also be understood as “enabler culpability” or “enabling atrocity.”  My current 
research focuses on further developing the contours of the “enabler responsibility” theory, which 
is the subject of a forthcoming article.  This research project also re-conceptualize concepts at the 
heart of ICL, such as gravity, modes of liability, and the role of the accused.  Thus, my theory 
pulls together these key sentencing factors to effectuate their harmonized consideration for the 
purpose of sentence allocations and just distribution of punishment among actors responsible for 
atrocity crimes.  The theory explains variations in sentence allocations and integrates them with 
sentencing narratives and the goals of international prosecutions. 
 11 Charles C. Jalloh, The Contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the 
Development of International Law, 15 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 169 (2007); Lans Gberie, 
Tejan Kabbah: This Is My Life, NEWAFRICAN (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.newafr 
icanmagazine.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=258:tejan-kabbah-this-is-my-li 
fe&Itemid=683; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial 
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hoped this would mark a turning point for a country devastated by war since 
1991, tensions continued among armed groups, and their lust for power and 
wealth remained unabated.12  Soon after the elections, conflict between the new 
government and armed leaders of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
resumed.  The RUF claimed that Kabbah’s government was overrun with 
corruption, justifying an armed rebellion by the people.13  The hostilities were 
intense, violent, and prolonged.  Even if freeing Sierra Leoneans from corruption 
and misrule is accepted as the RUF’s reasons for instigating armed conflict, they 
pursued this political goal with a brutal viciousness against civilians that belies 
their claim that they acted for the people.14  The RUF’s war against Sierra 
Leone’s democratically elected government, and against past ruling regimes, 
was supported by Charles Taylor and his special armed forces, the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), from neighboring Liberia.15 
In December 1996, President Kabbah and RUF leader Foday Saybana 
Sankoh signed a peace agreement, the Abidjan Peace Accord, granting 
blanket amnesty to RUF fighters.16  However, peace did not last long.  
Within months war consumed the country again.  In March 1997, Sankoh 
was placed under house arrest in Nigeria for alleged weapons violations.17  A 
few months later, a handful of opportunistic military officers in the Sierra 
Leone Army (SLA) overthrew President Kabbah and the newly elected 
government with a brutal military assault on Freetown in which Charles 
Taylor had “a heavy footprint” in planning, supporting, and overseeing.18  
                                                                                                                   
Chamber Sentencing Judgment (Spec. Ct. Sierra Leone Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter RUF 
Sentencing Judgment]. 
 12 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice and The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’s War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 55, 71 (2003) (stating that the atrocities were 
occasioned by the desire to control the country’s natural resources). 
 13 See Babafemi Akinrinade, International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra 
Leone, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 391, 392 (2001); Jalloh, supra note 11, at 
169; RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 146. 
 14 See, e.g., SMILLIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; Fritz & Smith, supra note 1, at 394. 
 15 Jamie O’Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support 
Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 207, 213 (2004); Fritz & Smith, supra note 1, at 394 (discussing how after the RUF entered 
Sierra Leone and controlled the Eastern region of the country, it implemented Charles Taylor’s a 
campaign of terror by abducting children, forcing prostitution, and amputating limbs). 
 16 Fritz & Smith, supra note 1, at 395.  
 17 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Trial Chamber Judgment ¶ 19 (Spec. Ct. Sierra 
Leone Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter RUF Trial Judgment]. 
 18 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶¶ 76, 77, 98; see also Sierra Leone: Getting Away With 
Murder, Mutilation, and Rape, 11 HUMAN RTS. WATCH 3(A), at 12 (July 1999); James Rupert, 
Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa’s Brutal Wars, WASH. POST FOREIGN SERV., Oct. 16, 1999; Ian 
Stewart, President Opens Talks as City Burns, TIMES DAILY, Jan. 8, 1999. 
2014] THE SENTENCING LEGACY OF THE SCSL  621 
 
Establishing themselves as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), they installed one of their own, Johnny Paul Koroma, as Sierra 
Leone’s new President.  Although the AFRC and RUF joined forces, their 
union was an uneasy one.  Together they fought against the Civil Defense 
Force (CDF), a loosely organized fighting force loyal to President Kabbah 
and his ousted government.19  The CDF was led by Samuel Hinga Norman, 
and its ranks were filled with Kamajor fighters, members of the Sierra Leone 
Mende ethnic group.  With the support of a West African multilateral armed 
force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, 
the CDF regained control of Freetown and reinstate President Kabbah.  The 
retreating AFRC and RUF fighters pillaged villages, killed or imprisoned 
civilians, and otherwise terrorized the population.  
After two more years of fighting, another peace agreement was signed and 
again Sankoh and his soldiers were granted full amnesty despite the horrible 
atrocities they committed against innocent men, women, and children.20  The 
Lome Peace Agreement was signed in 1999 between President Kabbah and the 
RUF represented by Sankoh.21  Despite Sankoh’s claim that he waged war to 
fight against a corrupt Kabbah, Sankoh agreed to be his vice-president and stop 
the fighting.22  Of course, getting official control over Sierra Leone’s lucrative 
diamond fields probably eased his hardship of having to share power with 
someone he accused of being corrupt, revealing more about his motives for the 
waging war than his rhetoric.  In less than a year, Sankoh had gone from death 
row to the country’s vice-presidency.23  The policy of “peace without 
accountability” again proved an utter failure when Kabbah, under pressure 
from the British and Americans, pardoned Sankoh’s legal conviction for 
murder of ordinary Sierra Leoneans and welcomed him with a prominent 
position in government.24  Deals with the devil cannot bring peace or justice.  
Two peace agreements and two full amnesties failed to deliver lasting 
peace.  More hostilities followed and so too did graver atrocities.  
Throughout the war, Charles Taylor, by then President of Liberia, provided 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Judgment (Aug. 2, 
2007) [hereinafter CDF Trial Judgment]; see also Lansana Gberie, The Civil Defense Forces 
Trial: Limit to International Justice?, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY, 
supra note 9, at 633–34.  
 20 Tony Karon, The Resistible Rise of Foday Sankoh, TIME, May 12, 2000, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,45102,00.html. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. 
 24 Obituaries: Foday Sankoh, TELEGRAPH, July 31, 2003, available at http://www.telegra 
ph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1437579/Foday-Sankoh.html. 
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material support to RUF/AFRC armed groups, including supplying arms and 
military personnel.25  Eventually, a UN peacekeeping mission was deployed 
to Sierra Leone (UNAMISL) and in 2002 the hostilities finally ceased.26  In 
June 2000, President Kabbah wrote a letter to the United Nations Security 
Council requesting the establishment of a “special court for Sierra Leone” to 
prosecute RUF and AFRC leaders for atrocities that brutalized and terrorized 
the people of Sierra Leone for more than ten years.27 
III.  FROM AMNESTY TO ACCOUNTABILITY: A UNIQUE COURT IS BORN  
After the failures of the “peace with amnesty” strategy, movement towards 
accountability and justice gained traction, perhaps encouraged by the 
international tribunal model in response to the atrocities in Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia.  The adopted mechanism, however, departed from the model of 
the ad hoc tribunals, creating an innovative court.28  The legal authority for the 
SCSL rests on a bilateral agreement between the United Nations and the 
government of Sierra Leone concluded in January 2002.  The Preamble of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution regarding the Court states: “a 
credible system of justice and accountability for very serious crimes 
committed there would end impunity and would contribute to the process of 
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”29  The 
Court has authority to prosecute crimes against humanity (CAH), war crimes 
(WC) and crimes found in the national laws of Sierra Leone.30  However, the 
codified crimes are not accompanied by individualized penalty ranges or 
maximums, violating international standards for nulla poena sine lege.31  The 
statute provides only a single scant article on penalties, no identifiable 
maximum terms, and does nothing more than rule out the death penalty.32 
                                                                                                                   
 25 O’Connell, supra note 15, at 216–18. 
 26 Id.  
 27 President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Letter dated Aug. 9, 2000, from the Permanent 
Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000). 
 28 See Jalloh, supra note 2, at 398–404 (discussing the creation of the court). 
 29 See Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 12 (citing U.N. Sec. Res. 1315 (2000),14 Aug. 2000, ¶ 7). 
 30 Agreement Between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, adopted August 14, 2000, arts. 2–5, available at 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/RSCSL%20Agreemtn%20and%20Statute.pdf [hereinafter 
SCSL Statute].  In practice, however, the Prosecutor never charged crimes under domestic law. 
 31 See Dana, supra note 5, at 857 (advancing a theoretical and doctrinal framework for 
nulla poena sine lege under international law). 
 32 For a discussion on the death penalty for atrocity crimes see, Jens David Ohlin, Applying 
the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (2005). 
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The SCSL tried nine individuals in four separate cases.  Eight defendants 
were prosecuted in three separate trials grouped according to the armed 
groups they aligned with during the conflict: (1) RUF trial against defendants 
Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao;33 (2) the AFRC trial 
against defendants Alex Tamba Brima (a.k.a. Gullit), Santigie Borbor Kanu, 
and Brima Bazzy Kamara, all high-ranking officials;34 and (3) CDF trial 
against defendants Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, both top leaders.35  
President Charles Taylor was tried separately.36  Thus, there was one trial of 
government supporters (CDF) and three trials against opponents of the Sierra 
Leone government (Charles Taylor, RUF, and AFRC).  In addition, a few 
other perpetrators were also indicted,37 but they either died before their trial 
commenced38 or before a judgment was pronounced.39  The following 
sections provide a legal analysis of the trial and sentencing judgments for 
each group of defendants.   
A.  The Head of State Trial: Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor 
1.  The Crimes 
In March 2003, the SCSL issued an arrest warrant for a sitting Head of 
State.  Charles Taylor, President of Liberia, was summoned to answer an 
eighteen-count indictment charging him with crimes against humanity and 
                                                                                                                   
 33 RUF Trial Judgment; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, 
Appeal Judgment (Oct. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsSes 
ayKallonandGbaoRUFCase/tabid/105/Default.aspx [hereinafter RUF Appeal Judgment]. 
 34 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment (June 20, 
2007) [hereinafter AFRC Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. 
SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 19, 2007) [hereafter AFRC Sentencing Judgment]; 
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeal Judgment (Feb. 22, 
2008), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsBrimaKamaraandKanuAFRCC 
ase/tabid/106/Default.aspx [hereinafter AFRC Appeal Judgment].  
 35 CDF Trial Judgment; Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, 
Sentencing Judgment (Oct. 9, 2007) [hereinafter CDF Sentencing Judgment]; Prosecutor v. 
Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment (May 28, 2008), available 
at http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorsvsFofanaandKanuAFRCCase/tabid/106/Default. 
aspx [hereinafter CDF Appeal Judgment]. 
 36 Taylor Sentencing Judgment. 
 37 Prosecutor v. Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-03-04-I-003, Decision Approving the Indictment 
(Mar. 7, 2003); see also Prosecutor v. Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-03-02-I-001, Decision 
Approving the Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003). 
 38 Prosecutor v. Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-03-04-PT, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8, 2003). 
 39 Prosecutor v. Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-03-02-PT-054, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8, 
2008). 
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war crimes.40  But it would be some time before Taylor would appear before 
the Court.  After stepping down from the presidency, Taylor went into exile 
in Nigeria.  Although the Nigerian government initially resisted surrendering 
Taylor to the SCSL, it eventually relented to international pressure, including 
requests for his arrest and surrender by Liberia’s newly elected President 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.41  In June 2006, Taylor’s trial was transferred from 
Freetown to The Hague for security concerns.  On April 26, 2012, Taylor 
was found guilty of planning and aiding and abetting “some of the most 
heinous and brutal crimes recorded in human history.”42  Specifically, Taylor 
was convicted of acts of terrorism, murder, rape, sexual slavery, cruel 
treatment, recruitment of child soldiers, enslavement and pillage.43  At the 
time of his sentencing, Charles Taylor was sixty-four years old.44   
Article 6(1) states: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall 
be individually responsible for the crime.”45  Articles 2 to 4 consist of crimes 
against humanity, violations of Additional Protocol II and Article 3 Common 
to the Geneva Conventions, and other breaches of international humanitarian 
law.  Pursuant to Article 6.1 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber convicted 
Charles Taylor for planning and aiding and abetting in crimes against 
humanity and war crimes in Freetown, Kono, and Makeni between 
December 1998 and February 1999.46  However, the Trial Chamber made no 
findings and provided no reasons for its planning conviction in relation to 
Counts 1–8 and 11 for crimes committed in the Kono District.47  
Consequently, the Appeals Chamber reversed the planning convictions in 
those counts for crimes committed in the Kono District.48 
The Trial Chamber found that Taylor aided and abetted the RUF and 
AFRC’s operational strategy to commit atrocity crimes against the civilian 
population of Sierra Leone.49  Crucial to Taylor’s conviction was the Trial 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 82. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. ¶ 70.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. ¶ 82. 
 45 SCSL Statute, art. 6(1). 
 46 Id. ¶ 1. 
 47 Taylor Appeal Judgment ¶¶ 571–574. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Taylor Trial Judgment ¶ 6905 (These crimes included murders, rapes, sexual slavery, 
looting, abductions, forced labour, conscription of child soldiers, amputations and other forms 
of physical violence and acts of terror); Taylor Appeal Judgment ¶ 253. 
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Chamber’s finding that his actions were “critical in enabling” the RUF’s and 
AFRC’s crimes and that Taylor “supported, sustained, and enhanced” their 
criminality.50  His conviction also rested on his practical and moral support to 
the AFRC and the RUF in the commission of crimes.51  Practical assistance 
included supplying perpetrators with arms and ammunition as well as 
providing military personnel.52  Through ongoing consultation and guidance, 
he provided encouragement and moral support to the RUF and AFRC 
fighters.53  The judges also found Taylor guilty of planning the commission of 
crimes in the attacks on Kono and Makeni, and in the invasion of and retreat 
from Freetown between December 1998 and February 1999.54  The findings of 
fact showed that Taylor not only planned the attacks, but also closely followed 
their implementation via daily communications with rebel groups.55  
2.  The Punishment 
According to the Trial Chamber, sentencing for international crimes 
must serve the primary objectives of retribution and deterrence.56  
Retribution is defined as “duly expressing the outrage of the international 
community at these crimes.”57  Moreover, punishment by international 
tribunals should “make plain the condemnation of the international 
community of the behavior in question” and express its intolerance toward 
such serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
law.58  As for deterrence, the judges considered both general and specific 
deterrence as relevant to determining an appropriate sentence.  However, 
the Taylor Trial Chamber rejected rehabilitation as a factor in ICL 
sentencing allocations, a view not shared by all SCSL judges.59  Despite 
identifying retribution and deterrence as the “primary objectives” of ICL 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Taylor Trial Judgment ¶¶ 6914, 6924, 6936–6937, 6944, 6946, 6959; Taylor Appeal 
Judgment ¶ 254. 
 51 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 76. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. ¶ 77.  
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. ¶ 13.  
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. ¶ 14. 
 59 Id. ¶ 79 (holding that retribution and deterrence are the primary functions of ICL 
sentencing and rejecting rehabilitation as a sentencing factor).  Cf. CDF Sentencing Judgment 
¶ 26 (treating rehabilitation as a “primary” consideration in sentencing along with retribution 
and deterrence); AFRC Sentencing Judgment ¶¶ 13–14 (also regarding rehabilitation as a 
primary goal of ICL sentencing along with retribution and deterrence). 
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sentencing, the Taylor Trial Chamber implicitly called into question their 
primacy by adding that  
the main purpose of a sentence is to influence the legal 
awareness of the accused, the surviving victims, and their 
relatives and the general public in order to reassure them that 
legal system is implemented and enforced.  Sentencing is 
intended to convey the message that globally accepted laws and 
rules have to be obeyed by everybody.60   
The judges identified four imperative considerations, grounded in the 
SCSL’s constitutive legal texts, that were relevant to determining a fair sentence 
for Charles Taylor: (1) gravity of the offense; (2) individual circumstances of the 
accused; (3) applicable aggravating and mitigating factors; and (4) where 
appropriate, the sentencing principles found in the practice of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Sierra Leone.61  This is consistent 
with the general sentencing jurisprudence of the SCSL, although in practice 
judges often collapsed together the second and third categories (individual 
circumstances of the accused and applicable aggravating and mitigating 
factors).62  As explained below, this merger is a missed opportunity to develop a 
sentencing framework tailored to ICL.   
Regarding the first consideration, the judges begin with the standard 
affirmation that “gravity of the offense is the primary consideration in 
imposing a sentence and is the litmus test” for ICL sentences.63  Moving 
beyond declaratory expressions, the Trial Chamber conceptualized “gravity” 
as a measure of two rudiments: the inherent gravity of the crime and the 
criminal conduct of the perpetrator.64  “Inherent” suggests an abstract 
assessment of the elements of the crime; however, what follows is not an 
“inherent” evaluation but a factual one.  The judges’ failure to have their 
analysis follow their avowed standards weakens the normative value of their 
sentencing judgment and increases the likelihood of error and double counting. 
After carefully laying out this reasonable analytical framework (above) 
for determining gravity, the judges appear to depart from it.  Regarding the 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 16 (citing Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, 
Sentencing Judgment ¶ 139 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003)). 
 61 Id. ¶ 18. 
 62 Id. ¶ 22 (“The Trial Chamber notes that ‘individual circumstances of the convicted 
person’ can be either mitigating or aggravating.”). 
 63 Id. ¶ 19. 
 64 Id.  
2014] THE SENTENCING LEGACY OF THE SCSL  627 
 
first measure of gravity, the Trial Chamber explained that in determining the 
gravity of Taylor’s offense it specifically considered seven “gravity” factors: 
(1) the “scale” of the offenses committed; (2) their “brutality”; (3) the 
temporal scope of the crime; (4) the “role of the Accused” in their 
commission; (5) the “number of victims”; (6) the “degree of suffering” or 
impact of the crime on the immediate victim; (7) the crime’s “effect on 
relatives” of the victim; and (8) the “vulnerability” of victims.65  While these 
factors are relevant to sentence allocations, the judges are not actually 
examining the inherent gravity of the offense per their own 
conceptualization, but considering gravity-in-fact.66  This is often why they 
have trouble distinguishing gravity factors from aggravating factors.   
As applied to Taylor’s conduct, the Trial Chamber primarily considered 
the tremendous suffering caused by the commission of the crimes and the 
physical and psychological impact on the victims.67  The court recalled the 
horrifying testimony of a mother who was forced to carry a bag containing 
the heads of her children and a child who was ordered to amputate the hands 
of others and then punished for refusing to rape a woman.68  The Trial 
Chamber viewed such irreparable injuries as consequences of crimes that 
Taylor had a hand in either planning or aiding and abetting.69  The temporal 
scope of Taylor’s criminal conduct heightened the gravity of his crimes.  
Taylor was responsible for perpetrating atrocity crimes against innocent 
civilians and populations for over a five year period, not merely the eighteen 
month period between 1998–1999 during which the bulk of the crimes 
occurred.70  Moreover, like all SCSL judgments and ICL sentencing 
jurisprudence in general, the Taylor Trial Chamber considers the role of the 
accused in the crime within the balance of weighing the gravity of the 
offense, specifically, as it appears here as part of assessing the “inherent 
gravity of the offense.”  Although a relevant sentencing factor, it appears 
misplaced for the purpose of assessing “inherent” gravity.   
Regarding the second measure of gravity—the criminal conduct of the 
accused—the Trial Chamber examined the “mode of liability” supporting the 
accused’s conviction and “the nature and degree of his participation” in the 
offenses.71  Thus, properly understood, this is something different from the 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id. ¶ 20. 
 66 Id. ¶ 21. 
 67 Id. ¶ 71. 
 68 Id. ¶ 72. 
 69 Id. ¶ 71. 
 70 Id. ¶ 78. 
 71 Id. ¶ 21. 
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“role of the Accused” identified above as a gravity factor, although there could 
be potential overlap depending on the interpretation.  Taylor was convicted 
under two distinct modes of liability: (1) planning, and (2) aiding and abetting.  
The trial court accepted the argument that “aiding and abetting as a mode of 
liability generally warrants a lesser sentence than that to be imposed for more 
direct forms of participation.”72  Some SCSL judges even considered this to be 
a well-established principle in ICL sentencing, although there is some doubt 
about its status as a general principle and its actual scope.73  However, the 
Taylor Trial Chamber further declared that it would also consider “the unique 
circumstances of this case”74 when determining Taylor’s punishment, 
indicating perhaps its intention to offset this principle with another principle: 
those who plan crimes are deserving of greater punishment.  As discussed 
below, however, the sentencing judgment would have benefitted from 
explaining this point more clearly. In particular, the Trial Chamber’s findings 
that Taylor “enabled” the RUF crimes would justify a high sentence even if his 
mode of liability is largely viewed as aiding and abetting.75   
Regarding aggravating circumstances, the Taylor Trial Chamber stated 
that where a factor has already been taken into consideration in assessing the 
gravity of the offence, “it cannot be considered additionally as an 
aggravating factor and vice versa.”76  Likewise, if a factor is an element of 
the underlying crime, it cannot be used as an aggravating factor.77  The ICC 
followed these same principles in its first sentencing judgment.78  The Trial 
Chamber increased Taylor’s punishment based on several aggravating 
circumstances: his leadership role; his special status as Head of State; his 
                                                                                                                   
 72 Id. (emphasis added).  This ruling was found to be an error on appeal.  Taylor Appeal 
Judgment ¶ 651. 
 73 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007). 
 74 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 21. 
 75 See, e.g., Taylor Trial Judgment ¶¶ 5834–5835, 5842, 6913–6915 (finding that “Taylor’s acts 
and conduct had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes because they: (i) enabled the 
RUF/AFRC’s Operational Strategy; (ii) supported, sustained and enhanced the RUF/AFRC’s 
capacity to implement its Operational Strategy.”).  My “enabler responsibility” theory, the focus my 
forthcoming article, provides a stronger, more transparent, and more predictable justification for 
punishment than a broad appeal to “unique circumstances.”  See Shahram Dana, Enabler 
Responsibility: A Theory for Punishing Atrocity Crimes (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 76 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 28. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, T.Ch. I, Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
April 76 of the Statute, ¶ 15 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi-int/en_menus/icc/situations% 
20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/c
ourt%20records/chambers/trial%20chamber%20i/Pages/2842.aspx [hereinafter Lubanga 
Sentencing Judgment]. 
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betrayal of trust; the extraterritorial reach of his crimes; and his exploitation 
of war for personal financial gain.79   
The judges also held that the extraterritorial nature of Taylor’s 
criminality aggravated his punishment, a novel and controversial 
development in ICL.80  In the words of the Trial Chamber, “[w]hile Mr. 
Taylor never set foot in Sierra Leone, his heavy footprint is there . . . .”81  
They reasoned that acts of intervention by a Head of State in support of 
armed rebels in another State by way of financial assistance, training, 
supply of weapons, and logistic support constitutes a clear violation of the 
customary law of non-intervention.82  When a Head of State’s criminal 
conduct extends into neighboring countries, the extraterritorial reach of his 
criminality is an aggravating factor.83  As a sitting Head of State, Taylor 
“enabled” atrocity crimes in another country using the power of state 
institutions and military resources under his control as President of Liberia 
and Commander in Chief of its Armed Forces.84 
Taylor’s punishment was also aggravated because he sought and did in 
fact gain financially from his crimes.  The judges found that he benefitted 
by receiving diamonds in exchange for arms and ammunition used by 
rebels to “target civilians in a campaign of widespread terror and 
destruction.”85  Crimes such as terrorizing civilians, amputations, rape and 
murder were critical to maintaining control over the diamond fields.86  
Taylor deliberately participated in the commission of these crimes.87  
Finally, the Trial Chamber also appears to treat attacks on traditional places 
of sanctuary, such as churches, mosques, schools and hospitals, as an 
aggravating factor.88 
The Trial Chamber also opined that ICL sentencing law holds that 
mitigating circumstances need only be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.89  Unlike aggravating factors, such circumstances need not to be 
related to the offense.90  The Defense argued for mitigation of Taylor’s 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶¶ 95–103. 
 80 Id. ¶ 27. 
 81 Id. ¶ 98. 
 82 Id. ¶ 27. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. ¶ 97. 
 85 Id. ¶ 99. 
 86 Id. ¶ 75. 
 87 Id. ¶ 76. 
 88 Id. ¶ 26. 
 89 Id. ¶ 34 (listing mitigating circumstances). 
 90 Id. ¶ 31. 
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sentencing based on his remorse and individual circumstances, such as his age, 
health and family circumstances.91  Although international judges at the ICTR 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
sometimes accepted age, health, and family circumstances as mitigating 
factors, the Taylor Trial Chamber rejected the notion that such personalized 
factors should mitigate the punishment of a Head of State who was responsible 
for crimes against humanity and war crimes.92  In doing so, it also took the 
position that rehabilitation is not a factor that should influence the sentence of 
a high level perpetrator.93  Thus the judges appear to adopt a punitive model 
for sentencing.  They implicitly accepted that remorse may constitute a 
mitigation factor,94 Taylor showed no remorse and the judges declined to apply 
this mitigating factor to reduce his sentence.95  Thus, the sixty-four year-old 
Charles Taylor was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment.96 
Appealing the sentencing, Taylor argued that the Trial Chamber should 
have treated serving a sentence abroad as a mitigating factor.97  Taylor also 
argued that the Trial Chamber should not have considered the 
extraterritoriality of his criminality and his breach of trust as aggravating 
factors.98  He also claimed that the Trial Chamber erred in referring to Sierra 
Leonean law which makes no distinction between principal and accessory 
liability for sentencing purposes99 and by double-counting his position as 
Head of State as an aggravating factor.100  Significantly, relying on the Trial 
Chamber’s ruling that aiding and abetting liability generally warrants a lesser 
sentence than other forms of criminal participation, Taylor argued that his 
sentence should be lower than the direct perpetrators he aided, such as RUF 
leader Issa Hassan Sesay, who was sentenced to fifty-two years.  
On appeal, the SCSL confirmed Taylor’s fifty year sentence.101  It held that 
“the Trial Chamber erred in law by holding that aiding and abetting liability 
generally warrants a lesser sentence than other forms of criminal 
participation.”102  Focusing on the “totality principle,” the SCSL rejected an 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Id. ¶ 79. 
 92 Id.   
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. ¶ 91. 
 96 Id. at 40. 
 97 Taylor Appeal Judgment ¶ 647 n.1903.  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. ¶ 668. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.  at 305. 
 102 Id. ¶ 670. 
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abstract hierarchy among forms of criminal participation for the purposes of 
sentencing.103  The judges further opined that such a hierarchy was unsupported 
by customary international law.104  While recognizing that minor participation in 
a crime could justify a lesser penalty, a categorical approach to modes of liability 
was rejected in favor of considering the “totality” of the perpetrator’s conduct 
and criminality.105  The Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial Chambers’ 
remaining rulings on aggravating and mitigating factors.106 
 
TABLE 1:  CHARGES, CONVICTION, AND APPEAL SUMMARY FOR CHARLES TAYLOR 
 
                                                                                                                   
 103 Id. ¶¶ 661–671. 
 104 Id. ¶ 668. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
CRIMINAL CHARGES IN CHARLES TAYLOR TRIAL TAYLOR TC 
SENTENCE 
TAYLOR AC 
SENTENCE 
COUNT 1: Acts of Terrorism as War Crimes 
50 years 
 
(Global sentence only.  
Individual sentences for 
each conviction not 
rendered.) 
 
50 year sentence 
affirmed 
 
COUNT 2: Murder as CAH 
COUNT 3: Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons, in particular murder as WC 
COUNT 4: Rape as CAH 
COUNT 5: Sexual slavery / sexual violence as CAH 
COUNT 6: Outrages upon personal dignity as WC 
COUNT 7: Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-
being of persons, in particular cruel treatment as WC 
COUNT 8: Other inhumane acts as CAH 
COUNT 9: Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities as serious violation of international 
humanitarian law 
COUNT 10: Enslavement as CAH 
COUNT 11: Pillage as WC 
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B.  The RUF Trial: Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao   
1.  The Crimes 
The defendants Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao 
were members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).107  The RUF 
formed in the late 1980s with the goal of overthrowing what it considered 
to be a corrupt government in Sierra Leone.108  The RUF joined forces with 
Liberian fighters from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by 
Charles Taylor.109  Sesay was a senior officer and top commander in the 
RUF, junta, and AFRC/RUF forces.110  From early 2000 until about August 
2000, Sesay was a Battle Field Commander of the RUF and reported only 
to the leaders of the RUF and AFRC, Foday Saybana Sankoh and Johnny 
Paul Koroma, respectively.111  During Sankoh’s imprisonment from May 
2000 until July 2003, Sesay directed all RUF activities in Sierra Leone.112  
Kallon was also a senior officer and commander in the RUF, Junta and 
AFRC/RUF armed forces.113  Kallon was second in command only to 
Sesay.114  In early 2000 he became the Battle Group Commander in the 
RUF and reported only to Sesay, Sankoh and Koroma.115  In 2001, he 
became the Battle Field Commander.116  Gbao was a senior officer and 
commander in the RUF, subordinate only to the RUF Battle Group and 
Battle Field Commanders, and Koroma.117 
The Indictment alleged that all three accused acted in concert with 
Charles Taylor118 and carried out a campaign to terrorize the civilian 
population and anyone who supported the elected government of President 
Kabbah or failed to sufficiently support the AFRC and RUF.119   
The RUF defendants were charged with war crimes consisting of acts of 
terrorism; collective punishment; violence to life, health, and physical or 
                                                                                                                   
 107 RUF Trial Judgment ¶ 4. 
 108 Id. ¶ 9. 
 109 Id. ¶ 10. 
 110 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL – 2004-15-PT, Corrected Amended 
Consolidated Indictment ¶ 20 (Aug. 2, 2006). 
 111 Id. ¶ 22. 
 112 Id. ¶ 23. 
 113 Id. ¶ 24. 
 114 Id. ¶ 25. 
 115 Id. ¶ 27. 
 116 Id. ¶ 28. 
 117 Id. ¶ 33. 
 118 Id. ¶ 35. 
 119 Id. ¶ 44. 
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mental well-being, including murder and mutilations; outrages upon personal 
dignity; abductions and hostage taking; conscription or enlisting of children 
under the age of fifteen, pillaging; and attacks against personnel involved in 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission.120  They were also charged 
with crimes against humanity for widespread murders, extermination, rape, 
sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, and other inhumane 
acts.121 
Sesay and Kallon were found guilty of all counts, except count 16 
(murder as a crime against humanity) and count 18 (abductions and hostage 
taking).122  Their crimes included murder (as a war crime) and sexual 
violence against women and girls, and forced “marriages” as well as 
widespread and extremely brutal physical and mental violence against 
civilians, including mutilations and cutting off limbs, the use of child 
soldiers, abductions, forced labor, looting and burning homes.123  Gbao was 
found guilty of the same crimes, except for conscription and enlistment of 
children in armed conflict.124 
2.  The Punishment 
The RUF Trial Chamber held that “it is settled law that the goals and 
objectives” of international sentencing for atrocity crimes “derive 
essentially from the doctrines underlying penal sanctions in the domestic or 
national law setting.”125  Thus, it considered the penology underlying 
national criminal justice for ordinary crimes as the appropriate source from 
which to construct a philosophical framework for international sentencing 
for atrocity crimes.126  This may explain its practice of imposing more 
severe sentences than other tribunals.  The Trial Chamber identified 
retribution and deterrence (both general and specific) as the primary 
justifications for punishment.127  The RUF judges acknowledge that other 
objectives, such as prevention, rehabilitation, and stigmatization, are found 
in ICL sentencing jurisprudence but stops short of adopting them as 
                                                                                                                   
 120 Id. ¶ 22. 
 121 Id. ¶¶ 54–60. 
 122 RUF Trial Judgment ¶¶ 677–684. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. ¶¶ 684–687.  Specifically, Gbao was convicted of all counts in TABLE 2, except for 
counts 12, 16, 17, and 18.  See infra TABLE 2, at page 639. 
 125 RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 12. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. ¶ 13. 
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relevant consideration for sentencing allocations.128  For example, the 
judges associate rehabilitation with individual restoration and hold that this 
“is more relevant in the context of domestic criminality than international 
criminality.”129  Significantly, the judges also excluded reconciliation as a 
sentencing factor.  
The RUF Trial Chamber identified the same four constitutive 
considerations for determining an appropriate sentence as the Taylor Trial 
Chamber: gravity of the offense, individual circumstances of the accused, 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and if appropriate the general 
sentencing practices of the ICTR and the national courts of Sierra Leone.130  
No accused, however, was charged with offenses under Sierra Leonean 
law, so the Chamber never considered local law.131  The Trial Chamber 
further observed that an individual convicted of more crimes should receive 
a higher sentence and that the sentence should be individualized and 
proportionate.132  The Trial Chamber pronounced specific sentences for 
each crime before imposing a cumulative sentence,133 a welcomed 
improvement on the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, which merely 
provided an unspecific “global” sentence in contravention of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (RPE).134 
The Trial Chamber held that “gravity of the offense” is the “litmus test 
for the appropriate sentence.”135  In terms of methodology, the judges treated 
the “form and degree of the participation” in the crime as part of the gravity 
assessment.136  The Trial Chamber conceptualized “gravity of the offense” in 
terms of seven assessment points: (1) the “scale” of the offenses committed; 
(2) their “brutality”; (3) the “role of the Accused” in their commission; (4) 
the “number of victims”; (5) the “degree of suffering” or impact of the crime 
on the immediate victim; (6) the crime’s “effect on relatives” of the victim; 
and (7) the “vulnerability” of victims.137  More specifically, “the role of the 
Accused” is determined by the mode of liability that he was convicted of and 
                                                                                                                   
 128 Id. ¶ 14. 
 129 Id. ¶ 16. 
 130 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL – 2004-15-PT, Corrected Amended 
Consolidated Indictment (Aug. 2, 2006). 
 131 Id. ¶ 32. 
 132 Id. ¶ 18. 
 133 Id.  
 134 Dana, supra note 5, at 917–19. 
 135 RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 19. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
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the nature and degree of his participation in the commission of the offence.138  
Regarding the latter, the Trial Chamber held “aiding and abetting as a mode 
of liability generally warrants a lesser sentence than that imposed for a more 
direct form of participation.”139  However, in the last judgment it rendered, 
the SCSL disavowed this ruling as a general principle of ICL.140 
The “effect” of the crime on relatives of the victim includes serious 
mental and emotional suffering resulting from being forced to haplessly 
watch the murder of their family members, systematic rampage of their 
villages, indiscriminate sexual assaults and sexual slavery.141  All of these 
crimes were carried out for the purpose of terrorizing the population.142  
The victims, especially those of sexual crimes and sexual slavery, were 
young women and girls—an especially vulnerable group of individuals 
that is suffering the aftereffects of the crimes to this day.143  Similarly, 
victims of physical abuse, such as beatings, amputations, physical 
mutilations (hot irons were used to inscribe “RUF” into victims’ bodies), 
were subject to collective punishment and terrorizing and the aftereffects 
of these crimes left victims permanently disfigured, unconscious or 
dead.144  Moreover, a large number of victims were enslaved and 
abducted and children under fifteen years of age were used as soldiers.145  
Children—an especially vulnerable victim population—were arbitrarily 
abducted, subject to harsh training and made to commit various brutal 
crimes as soldiers.146  If an accused was convicted of participating in a 
joint criminal enterprise (JCE), the Trial Chamber considered the level of 
his contribution to the JCE.147  
The court found that Sesay was in a leadership position and was in a 
superior-subordinate relationship with the perpetrators that attacked 
UNAMSIL personnel.148  It concluded that Sesay was not directly 
responsible for the attacks on UNAMSIL, did not order such attacks, and 
was not involved in a joint criminal enterprise to commit these crimes.149  
                                                                                                                   
 138 Id. ¶ 20. 
 139 Id.  
 140 See generally Taylor Appeal Judgment.  See also supra Part III.A (discussing the 
prosecution of Charles Taylor). 
 141 RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 132. 
 142 Id. ¶ 210. 
 143 Id. ¶ 132. 
 144 Id. ¶ 155. 
 145 Id. ¶ 180. 
 146 Id. ¶ 183. 
 147 Id. ¶ 23. 
 148 Id. ¶ 63. 
 149 Id. ¶ 57. 
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Sesay’s liability for the attacks against UNAMSIL peacekeepers was by 
omission only.150  He failed to prevent or punish subordinates for their 
attacks on the UNAMSIL.151  Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber concluded 
that the gravity of Sesay’s crimes was “exceptionally high.”152 
By contrast, Kallon was found to have directly participated in the 
crimes.153  He abducted children for solider training and helped maintain 
a brutal system of forced recruitment of child soldiers.154  He ordered 
attacks on UN peacekeepers.155  Furthermore, Kallon was found to have 
substantially contributed to the JCE as a senior military leader.156  The 
Chamber found that Kallon was high-ranking and had the ability to 
control the subordinate commanders but failed to prevent or punish the 
crimes carried out by these individuals.157  The Trial Chamber found that 
the gravity of Kallon’s criminal conduct reached the highest levels with 
respect to the use of child soldiers and attacks on UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers.158  Gbao was found to have helped establish and manage a 
system of civilian enslavement, but not found to have direct control over 
fighters.159  Although Gbao’s crimes were serious, the Chamber found 
that his participation in the JCE was more limited than that of Sesay and 
Kallon.160  
The Trial Chamber relied on the ICTY’s sentencing jurisprudence to 
identify possible aggravating factors.161  These included the leadership role 
of the accused, motives, premeditation, enthusiastic participation in the 
crime, the temporal scope of the accused’s criminality, attacks on traditional 
places of sanctuary such as churches, schools and hospitals, sadism and 
desire for revenge, abuse of trust or official capacity, and total disregard for 
sanctity of human dignity and life.162  Although some of the accused 
exhibited bad behavior during trial, the court did not treat such behavior as 
an aggravating factor.   
                                                                                                                   
 150 Id. ¶ 61. 
 151 Id. ¶ 58. 
 152 Id. ¶ 116. 
 153 Id. ¶ 47. 
 154 Id. ¶ 236. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. ¶ 240. 
 157 Id. ¶ 218. 
 158 Id. ¶ 41. 
 159 Id. ¶ 268. 
 160 Id. ¶ 271. 
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According to the Trial Chamber, the only mitigating circumstance that it 
is required to take into account pursuant to the statute and RPE is the 
accused’s substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor.163  Penalty mitigation 
based on all other possible sentence-reducing factors are at the court’s 
discretion, including expression of remorse, lack of education or training, no 
prior convictions, personal and family circumstances, promotion of peace 
and reconciliation after the conflict, good behavior in detention and 
assistance to detainees or victims.164  
Although Sesay was himself forcibly recruited into the RUF at the age 
of nineteen, perhaps even younger, the Trial Chamber declined to treat this 
circumstance as a mitigating factor because he could have “chosen another 
path.”165  Moreover, the fact that he had no prior convictions was given 
little weight in mitigation.166  Sesay’s statement of remorse was found not 
to be sincere, but his empathy for the victims was given limited 
mitigation.167  Likewise, the Trial Chamber found that Kallon was forcibly 
recruited into the RUF and had no prior criminal convictions.168  But like 
Sesay, these factors would not find favor with the judges at the SCSL for 
the purpose of reducing Kallon’s sentence.  The occasional assistance 
Kallon provided to some civilians was not consistent enough to deserve 
penalty reduction.  For the Trial Chamber, it merely showed that the 
accused had the power to influence the RUF away from mass crimes but 
failed to do so.169  The Chamber did consider Kallon’s statement of remorse 
mitigating because he genuinely and sincerely acknowledged his role in the 
crimes and recognized the pain suffered by the victims.170  The Chamber 
also rejected Kallon’s claim that he was acting under duress in carrying out 
superior orders given to him by the RUF leadership.171  Gbao was not 
found to have expressed remorse for his crimes, but he was sixty years old 
at the time of trial and thus the Trial Chamber mitigated his sentencing on 
the account of old age.172  The Trial Chamber issued individual penalties 
for each crime that the accused was convicted of before issuing a 
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 172 Id. ¶ 277. 
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cumulative sentence.  The sentences, all to run concurrently, for each count 
are listed in TABLE 2.173 
The most severe sentences that Sesay received was for the war crimes of 
terrorism; mutilation; deliberate attacks on peacekeepers; conscripting and 
enlisting child soldiers; and enslavement as a crimes against humanity.174  
Each of these crimes was punished by a sentence of fifty years or more.  
These sentences were to run concurrently and Sesay received a total sentence 
of fifty-two years of imprisonment.175  The severest individual prison 
sentences that Kallon received were forty and thirty-nine years for deliberate 
attacks on peacekeeper and terrorism as a war crime, respectively.  Gbao’s 
punishment for the same two crimes was substantially less.  He received a 
prison sentence of twenty-five years for each crime (deliberate attacks on 
peacekeeper and terrorism as a war crime) to run concurrently.176  Thus, 
when we compare the prison sentence of twenty-five years for a low level 
foot soldier with the fifty-two years imposed on a high level commander, we 
observe a 100% increase in penalty.  Even comparing a high-ranking 
perpetrator (Kallon) with the highest-ranking figure (Sesay) in custody 
within the same organization, there is still a significant 25%–33% increase in 
prison time.  
The Appeals Chamber upheld all convictions for Sesay and Kallon but 
unanimously overturned Gbao’s conviction on count 2 (collective 
punishment) and found that he was not responsible for one of two attacks 
against UN peacekeepers in count 15.  Nevertheless, this reduction in the 
scope of Gbao’s criminal responsibility did not reduce his punishment 
overall, although sentences for relevant individual counts were revised.177 
  
                                                                                                                   
 173 Id. at 93; see infra TABLE 2, at p. 639. 
 174 RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶¶ 3, 6, 9. 
 175 Id. § IV. 
 176 Id.  
 177 RUF Appeal Judgment. 
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TABLE 2:  CHARGES, CONVICTIONS, AND APPEAL SUMMARY OF RUF DEFENDANTS 
CRIMINAL CHARGES IN RUF TRIAL SESAY TC 
SESAY AC 
UPHELD? 
KALLON 
TC 
KALLON AC 
UPHELD? GBAO TC 
GBAO AC 
UPHELD? 
COUNT 1: Acts of Terrorism as 
War Crimes (WC) 52 years Y 39 years Y 25 years Y 
COUNT 2: Collective Punishments 
as WC 45 years Y 35 years Y 20 years N 
COUNT 3: Extermination as Crime 
against humanity (CAH) 33 years Y 28 years Y 15 years Y 
COUNT 4:  Murder as CAH 40 years Y 35 years Y 15 years Y 
COUNT 5: Murder as WC 40 years Y 35 years Y 15 years Y 
COUNT 6:  Rape as CAH 45 years Y 35 years Y 15 years Y 
COUNT 7:  Sexual slavery / sexual 
violence as CAH 45 years Y 30 years Y 15 years Y 
COUNT 8:  Other inhumane acts as 
CAH 40 years Y 30 years Y 10 years Y 
COUNT 9: Outrages upon personal 
dignity as WC 35 years Y 28 years Y 10 years Y 
COUNT 10: Mutilation as WC 50 years Y 35 years Y 20 years Y 
COUNT 11: Other inhumane acts 
as CAH 40 years Y 30 years Y 11 years Y 
COUNT 12: Conscription or enlisting 
children under the age of 15 as WC 50 years Y 35 years Y NG NG 
COUNT 13:  Enslavement as CAH 50 years Y 35 years Y 25 years Y 
COUNT 14: Pillage as a WC 20 years Y 15 years Y 6 years Y 
COUNT 15: Attacking 
peacekeepers as a WC 51 years Y 40 years Y 25 years Y 
COUNT 16: Murder as CAH NG NG NG NG NG NG 
COUNT 17: Murder as WC 45 years Y 35 years Y NG NG 
COUNT 18:  Abductions/Hostage 
Taking as WC NG NG NG NG NG NG 
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C.  The AFRC Trial: Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu 
1.  The Crimes 
The AFRC fighting faction largely consisted of soldiers from the Sierra 
Leone Army (SLA).178  Alex Tamba Brima (aka Gullit) and Brima Bazzy 
Kamara were SLA Staff Sergeants.  Santigie Borbor Kanu (aka Five-Five) was a 
SLA Sergeant.179  Brima was a senior member of the AFRC and helped stage 
the coup that ousted the government of President Kabbah.  He was in direct 
command of the AFRC forces, which at times included RUF fighters, in the 
Kono District during the conflict.  Kamara also participated in the coup and was 
a member of a combined AFRC/RUF junta governing body.180  Kanu was also a 
senior member of the AFRC, the junta and AFRC/RUF forces.  He was also 
involved in the coup and was a member of the AFRC Supreme Council.  All 
three accused were commanders during the relevant period of conflict and they 
acted in concert with Charles Taylor to carry out the crimes.181  The three AFRC 
defendants and the three RUF defendants shared a common plan to take control 
of Sierra Leone, especially the diamond mining areas.182  The three AFRC 
fighters were charged with eleven counts of atrocities crimes as listed in TABLE 
3 below.183 
The Trial Chamber acquitted Brima and Kamara of count 11 (other 
inhumane acts as CAH) and refused to consider JCE as a mode of criminal 
responsibility because it found it to be defectively pleaded.  The court also 
dismissed count 7 (sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence as CAH) 
and count 8 (other inhumane acts as CAH) as duplicative pleadings of other 
charges.  Regarding the charges in counts 7, 8 and 9, Prosecution argued that 
forced marriages fell under count 8 as other inhumane acts and were distinct 
from sexual acts.184  The Trial Chamber rejected this argument and found that 
the evidence did not establish a non-sexual crime of “forced marriage” 
                                                                                                                   
 178 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment ¶ 12 
(Feb. 15, 2005), SCSL-04-16-PT, available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decision/AF 
RC/141/SCSL-04-16-PT-141.pdf. 
 179 Id. 
 180 AFRC Trial Judgment ¶ 70B. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. ¶ 60. 
 183 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment ¶ 12 
(Feb. 15, 2005), SCSL-04-16-PT, available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decision/AF 
RC/141/SCSL-04-16-PT-141.pdf; see infra TABLE 3, at p. 644.  
 184 AFRC Trial Judgment ¶ 701.  
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independent of sexual slavery under article 2(g) of the Statute.185  It concluded 
that the crime of sexual slavery subsumes the crime of “forced marriage” in 
count 9, and dismissed counts 7 and 8.  The Appeals Chamber overruled, finding 
that a forced marriage is not necessarily a sexual crime because “sex is not the 
only incident of the forced relationship.”  “A forced marriage involves a 
perpetrator compelling a person by force or threat of force, through words or 
conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him into a forced conjugal 
association” and results “in great suffering or physical or mental injury” to the 
victim.186  Although the Appeals Chamber found error with the Trial Chamber’s 
ruling on this issue, it declined to enter additional convictions for forced 
marriage.  Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber found that the JCE count was not 
defectively pleaded.187  Despite reversing the Trial Chambers rulings, which 
dismissed counts 7 and 8 and the JCE mode of liability, the Appeals Chamber 
affirmed the sentences of all three AFRC defendants.188  
2.  The Punishment 
Brima and Kanu were sentenced to fifty years imprisonment and Kamara 
received forty-five years.189  Unlike the judges in the RUF case, the AFRC Trial 
Chamber failed to provide a penalty for each crime the accused was convicted of 
before imposing a cumulative sentence.190  The judges here only offered a 
“global” sentence for multiple convictions.191  The AFRC Trial Chamber held 
that retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation are the main goals of sentencing for 
atrocity crimes and thus all three are determinative of proper sentencing 
allocations.192  The judges considered the standard sentencing factors such as the 
gravity of the offense, and any aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  They 
also dismissed the relevance of Sierra Leonean sentencing practices on the 
grounds that the accused were not charged with crimes under Sierra Leonean 
law.193  The Trial Chamber emphasized that the three accused were convicted of 
“some of the most heinous, brutal and atrocious crimes ever recorded in human 
history.”194 
                                                                                                                   
 185 Id. ¶ 704. 
 186 AFRC Appeal Judgment ¶ 195. 
 187 Id. ¶ 66. 
 188 Id. ¶ 67. 
 189 AFRC Sentencing Judgment ¶ 26. 
 190 Id.  
 191 Id. ¶ 30. 
 192 Id. ¶ 14. 
 193 Id. ¶ 32. 
 194 Id. ¶ 34. 
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With respect to Brima, the Trial Chamber found that he committed atrocity 
crimes against “very large numbers of unarmed civilians and had a catastrophic” 
impact on the victims and their families.195  Pursuant to Article 6(1),196 Brima 
was directly criminally responsible for exterminations, murders, mutilations 
(amputations of various limbs), and terrorizing the civilian population.  He 
personally planned and ordered the crimes of collective punishment, recruitment 
and use of child soldiers, sexual enslavement, looting, murders and enslavement 
of civilians.197  Brima was also found liable under Article 6(3), an indirect form 
of criminal responsibility by omission, for crimes committed by his subordinates 
in various districts.  He was a primary perpetrator of various murders of 
civilians, which the judges treated as indicative of the particular gravity of his 
offenses.198  The Trial Chamber found that no personal circumstances justified 
mitigation in Brima’s case.  The Chamber found that he was a professional 
soldier with a duty to protect civilians but failed to do so.199  In fact, Brima 
carried out attacks himself, which according to the Trial Chamber aggravated his 
punishment.200  Moreover, the Chamber found that Brima’s position as the 
overall commander of the troops was an aggravating factor.201  Other 
aggravating factors included Brima’s tactics of extreme coercion, his zealous 
participation in some of the crimes, and the prolonged period of time during 
which enslavement and attacks on places of worship were carried out.202  The 
Trial Chamber did not find Brima’s statement of remorse to be genuine and did 
not take this factor into consideration as mitigating.203 
With respect to Kamara, the Trial Chamber found him responsible under 
Article 6(1) for ordering five murders of civilians, planning abduction of 
children for use as child soldiers, planning crimes of sexual slavery and 
enslavement against civilians, aiding and abetting murder and extermination 
of civilians, and mutilations of persons.204  He was also found liable under 
Article 6(3) for crimes committed by subordinates in various districts.205  
Similar to Brima, Kamara’s crimes were extremely brutal because they 
                                                                                                                   
 195 Id. ¶ 40. 
 196 SCSL Statute, art. 6(1) states: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in 
articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.” 
 197 AFRC Sentencing Judgment ¶ 34. 
 198 Id. ¶ 40. 
 199 Id. ¶ 53. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. ¶ 55. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. ¶ 67. 
 204 Id. ¶ 70. 
 205 Id. ¶ 71. 
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targeted a very large number of unarmed civilians and impacted the victims’ 
lives in “catastrophic and irreversible” way.206  The Trial Chamber found that 
nothing in Kamara’s personal circumstances warranted mitigation of his 
punishment.207  Kamara was a professional soldier and instead of protecting 
civilians he attacked them and gave orders to the soldiers under his authority 
to attack them.208  The judges held that a professional soldier and ranking 
officer ordering attacks on civilians for whom he has a duty to protect is a 
particularly aggravating factor.209  Other aggravating factors in Kamara’s 
case included vulnerability of victims, the heinous nature of the crimes, and 
the fact that he was a senior government and military official with a duty to 
prevent or punish crimes.210  The court emphasized that the way the crimes 
were committed—locking civilians in their homes and setting them on fire 
until everyone inside burned alive—was especially cruel and constituted an 
aggravating factor.211  According to the judges, it also showed that Kamara 
was a direct and active participant in the crimes he ordered.212  Kamara’s 
position of authority was also considered an aggravating factor.213  The 
Chamber found no mitigating circumstances in his case.214 
With respect to Kanu, the Trial Chamber found him responsible under 
both Article 6(1) for direct participation in the crimes and Article 6(3) as a 
commander that failed to prevent or punish the crimes of subordinates under 
his control.215  The court held that Kanu was directly responsible pursuant to 
Article 6(1) for: (a) planning abduction of children for use as child soldiers; 
(b) committing sexual slavery and enslavement of civilians; (c) ordering 
murders and mutilations; (d) personally mutilating civilians and looting 
civilian property; (e) instigating other murders; and (f) aiding and abetting 
murder and extermination of civilians.216  Kanu was found liable under 
Article 6(3) for failing to prevent or punish the crimes of his subordinates in 
various districts.217  The judges rejected his claim that the bulk of the crimes 
were committed by the RUF, who were not under his control.218   
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 207 Id. ¶ 78. 
 208 Id. ¶ 73. 
 209 Id. ¶ 82. 
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Similar to Kamara and Brima, the court rejected arguments for mitigation 
based on Kanu’s personal circumstances.219  The judges did find, however, 
that Kanu’s leadership position, third in command of the armed forces, was 
an aggravating factor.220 Moreover, Kanu’s demonstration of amputations 
and orders to commit killings were aggravating factors.221  There was also no 
evidence that Kanu was acting under duress in carrying out the crimes.222  
Kanu’s statement to the Chamber expressed no remorse and was thus not 
taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance.223 
TABLE 3:  CHARGES, CONVICTIONS, AND APPEAL SUMMARY OF AFRC DEFENDANTS 
                                                                                                                   
 219 Id. ¶ 105. 
 220 Id. ¶ 106. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. ¶ 113. 
 223 Id. ¶ 139. 
CRIMINAL CHARGES IN 
ARFC TRIAL 
BRIMA 
TC 
BRIMA 
AC 
UPHELD? 
KAMARA TC 
KAMARA 
AC 
UPHELD? 
KANU 
TC 
KANU AC 
UPHELD? 
COUNT 1: Acts of Terrorism 
as War Crimes (WC) 
50 years 
(pursuant to a 
global sentence 
for all 
convictions) 
 
Y 45 years 
(pursuant to a 
global 
sentence for 
all 
convictions) 
 
 
Y 
50 years 
in total 
 
Y 
COUNT 2: Collective 
Punishments as WC Y Y RV 
COUNT 3: Extermination as 
CAH Y Y Y 
COUNT 4:  Murder as CAH Y Y Y 
COUNT 5: Violence to life, 
particularly murder as WC Y Y Y 
COUNT 6:  Rape as CAH Y Y Y 
COUNT 7:  Sexual slavery / 
sexual violence as CAH 
Dismissed 
(DM) 
Reversed 
(RV) DM RV DM RV 
COUNT 8:  Other inhumane 
acts as CAH DM RV DM RV DM RV 
COUNT 9: Outrages upon 
personal dignity as WC, 
specifically rape, forced 
prostitution, and indecent 
assault 
part of 50 years 
Y part of 45 
years 
Y 
part of 
50 years 
Y 
COUNT 10: Violence to life 
as WC Y Y Y 
COUNT 11: Other inhumane 
acts as CAH NG NG NG NG Y 
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D.  The CDF Trial: Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa 
1.  The Crimes 
The Civil Defence Forces (CDF) fought against the RUF and the AFRC 
during the conflict in Sierra Leone.224  The CDF was under the leadership of 
the Samuel Hinga Norman, who was considered as the group’s “National 
Coordinator” and was a popular war hero to many Sierra Leoneans.225  The 
defendants in the CDF trial were Norman and two other top CDF leaders: 
Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa.226  The CDF defendants contended 
throughout the trial that they were simply attempting to restore democracy 
and power to the democratically elected President Kabbah, whose 
government was overthrown by the AFRC in 1997.227  They were charged 
with murder as both crimes against humanity and war crimes; inhumane acts 
as a crime against humanity; and six counts of war crimes, including 
violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons (in 
particular cruel treatment), pillaging, acts of terrorism, collective 
punishments, and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.228 
The trial proceedings against Samuel Hinga Norman were terminated when 
he died after the trial was completed but before a judgment was pronounced.229  
The Trial Chamber acquitted Fofana of all crimes against humanity and found 
him guilty of war crimes only.230  In particular, he was convicted of murder, 
cruel treatment, pillage, and collective punishment.231  The Trial Chamber 
articulated sentences for each conviction (all to run concurrently) before 
entering a cumulative sentence.  Fofana was sentenced to 6 years for murder, 6 
years for inhumane acts, 3 years for pillage, and 4 years for collective 
punishment.232  Kondewa was convicted of murder (for which he received a 
prison sentence of eight years), cruel treatment (eight years), pillage (five 
years), acts of terrorism (six years), and enlisting and/or using children in 
                                                                                                                   
 224 CDF Trial Judgment ¶ 2. 
 225 Id. ¶ 1. 
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hostilities (seven years).233  Kondewa was likewise acquitted of all crimes 
against humanity as well as acts of terrorism as a war crime.234  
The not guilty verdicts for crimes against humanity in counts one and 
three indicates that the judges concluded that Fofana and Kondewa lacked 
awareness of the contextual or jurisdictional elements necessary for a 
conviction for this category of crimes.  It does not mean that they did not 
commit the constitutive elements of the underlying crimes of murder and 
inhumane acts.  Their convictions for both murder and cruel treatment as war 
crimes under counts two and four respectively establish that Fofana and 
Kewdona did indeed perpetrate the underlying crimes according to the Trial 
Chamber.  In fact, as discussed below, the Appeals Chamber reversed the 
trial judges on this point and found both defendants criminally responsible 
for crimes against humanity for murder and inhumane treatment.235  
Regarding the war crimes of pillage, the Trial Chamber convicted 
Kondewa pursuant to a theory of superior responsibility under Article 6(3) 
for separate incidents of pillage in Moyamba District and again in the Bonthe 
District.236  The Appeals Chamber, however, reversed Kondewa’s conviction 
for superior responsibility regarding pillage committed in Moyamba on the 
grounds that it was not established beyond a reasonable doubt that Kondewa 
exercised control over the perpetrators.237  The Appeals Chamber also set 
aside some of Kondewa’s convictions for lack of evidence.238  Specifically, 
the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s guilty verdicts against 
Kondewa pursuant to Article 6(1) for murder committed in Talia and Base 
Zero and for enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed 
forces or groups and using them to participate actively in hostilities.239  Thus, 
at the conclusion of his appeal, Allieu Kondewa was acquitted on counts 6, 7 
and 8, and was found guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (in part) pursuant to 
the following modes of liability240:   
• Count 1 for murder241 as a crime against humanity242 pursuant 
to Article 6(1) for aiding and abetting the murders committed 
                                                                                                                   
 233 Id. at 34. 
 234 Id. ¶ 52. 
 235 Id. 
 236 CDF Sentencing Judgment p. 33. 
 237 CDF Appeal Judgment ¶ 580B. 
 238 Id. ¶ 560. 
 239 Id. at 187. 
 240 Id.  
 241 By majority with at least one judge dissenting. 
 242 SCSL Statute, art. 2.a.  
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in Tongo Fields and pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior 
responsibility for the murders committed in Bonthe District. 
For these murders, Kondewa was sentenced to twenty years 
of imprisonment.243 
• Count 2 for murder244 as a war crime245 pursuant to Article 6(1) 
for aiding and abetting the murders committed in Tongo Fields 
and pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior responsibility for the 
murders committed in Bonthe District. For these murders, 
Kondewa was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment.246 
• Count 3 for other inhumane acts, as a crime against 
humanity247 pursuant to Article 6(1) for aiding and abetting 
the murders committed in Tongo Fields and pursuant to 
Article 6(3) for superior responsibility for the other inhumane 
acts committed in Bonthe District.  For these inhumane acts, 
Kondewa was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment.248 
• Count 4 for cruel treatment as a war crime249 pursuant to 
Article 6(1) for aiding and abetting the murders committed in 
Tongo Fields and pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior 
responsibility for cruel treatment committed in Bonthe 
District.  For the war crime of cruel treatment, Kondewa was 
sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment.250 
• Count 5 for pillage as a war crime in violation of common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
II251 pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior responsibility for 
pillage war crimes committed in Bonthe District.  For the war 
crime of pillage, Kondewa was sentenced to seven years of 
imprisonment.252 
Regarding Fofana, the Appeals Chamber reversed his conviction on count 7 
for the war crime of collective punishment, but also reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s acquittal on counts 1 and 3 for murder and inhumane acts as a 
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crime against humanity.253  It also unanimously held that Fofana was not guilty 
of acts of terrorism and, by majority, not guilty of war crimes for collective 
punishment and enlisting child soldiers.254  Thus, Fofana was found guilty on 
counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 and not guilty on counts 6, 7 and 8.  The final 
disposition of the charges against Moinina Fofana are as follows, including the 
applicable mode of liability: 
• Count 1 for murder as a crime against humanity255 pursuant to 
Article 6(1) for aiding and abetting the murders committed in 
Tongo Fields and pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior 
responsibility for the murders committed in Koribondo and 
Bo District.  For these murders, Fofana was sentenced to 
fifteen years of imprisonment.256 
• Count 2 for murder as a war crime257 pursuant to Article 6(1) 
for aiding and abetting the murders committed in Tongo 
Fields and pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior responsibility 
for the murders committed in Koribondo and Bo District.  For 
these murders, Fofana was sentenced to fifteen years of 
imprisonment.258 
• Count 3 for other inhumane acts, as a crime against 
humanity259 pursuant to Article 6(1) for aiding and abetting the 
murders committed in Tongo Fields and pursuant to Article 
6(3) for superior responsibility for the other inhumane acts 
committed in Koribondo and Bo District.  For these inhumane 
acts, Fofana was sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment.260 
• Count 4 for cruel treatment as a war crime261 pursuant to 
Article 6(1) for aiding and abetting the murders committed in 
Tongo Fields and pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior 
responsibility for cruel treatment committed in Koribondo 
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and Bo District.  For these cruel treatments, Fofana was 
sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment.262 
• Count 5 for pillage as a war crime in violation of common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
II263 pursuant to Article 6(3) for superior responsibility for 
pillage war crimes committed in Bo District.  For the war 
crime of pillage, Fofana was sentenced to five years of 
imprisonment.264 
2.  The Punishment 
The CDF Trial Chamber held that “[a]ccording to the jurisprudence of the 
international criminal tribunals . . . the primary objectives of international 
criminal tribunals are retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation.”265  Notably, 
the judges are not limiting themselves here to merely stating the primary 
objectives of ICL, but are actually declaring what they find to be the 
international standard on the issue.266  Conceptualizing retribution for 
atrocity crimes, the judges opined that retribution is not about “revenge” but 
about “duly expressing the outrage of the international community at these 
crimes.”267  The Trial Chamber elaborated that a sentence from an 
international criminal court “should make plain the condemnation of the 
international community of the behavior in question and show that the 
international community was not ready to tolerate serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights.”268 
When it came to defining retribution, the judges in the CDF trial adopted a 
definition articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada: “appropriate punishment 
which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender . . . requires the 
imposition of a just and appropriate punishment.”269  The explicit reference to a 
foreign country, culture, and legal system’s understanding of retribution and 
declared intention to follow that understanding is probably explained by the fact 
that one of the judges in this case was Canadian.270   
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The Trial Chamber considered rehabilitation less important in 
international tribunals than in domestic law and emphasized that “in the 
particular circumstances of Sierra Leone,” the court should seek to “end 
impunity” and “contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace.”271  The Chamber also noted that “one 
of the main purposes” of sentencing is to inform the general public that 
international rules apply to everyone.272  The Trial Chamber also observed 
that the principle of proportionality applied to sentencing allocations.273 
The Trial Chamber considered the gravity of the offense, and any 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining a proper sentence.  
Regarding gravity, the trial judges in the CDF case suggest a subtle shift: 
gravity is conceptualized in their “view” as an “important factor” in 
determining the length of a prison sentence, rather than a primary factor.274  
In the punishment of Charles Taylor and the RUF and AFRC fighters, 
gravity was more than an important factor; it was the primary factor 
determining sentencing allocations.275 Underscoring this subtle shift is the 
distinction the CDF Trial Chamber makes between their view (gravity as an 
important factor) and the general sentencing jurisprudence, which regards 
gravity as “the litmus test” for a fair sentence.276  It would be easy to dismiss 
this as a trivial difference in word selection.  But as trained judges and 
lawyers, we understand how word choice creates conceptual space or signals 
significance.  Are the judges in the CDF case signaling their intent to render 
a less severe penalty and laying the groundwork for the justification here? 
For the remaining brief discussion on gravity, the judges in the CDF case 
followed the typical conceptualization of gravity by taking into account the 
particular circumstances of the crimes committed, specifically the “scale and 
brutality of the offenses committed, the role played by the Accused in their 
commission, the degree of suffering or impact of the crime on the immediate 
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victim, as well as its effect on relatives of the victim, and the vulnerability 
and number of victims.”277  
The “role of the Accused in the crime” is folded into the assessment of 
the gravity of the offense.  The “role of the Accused” within this framework 
is determined by examining two prongs: (1) the mode of liability under 
which the accused was convicted and (2) the nature and degree of his 
participation in the crime.278  While the sentencing judgment is thus far 
methodical in laying out its approach, the judges then introduced opacity into 
the sentencing determination: “In particular, the Chamber has considered 
whether the Accused was held liable as an indirect or secondary 
perpetrator.”279  This analytical approach depends heavily on the direct 
versus indirect dichotomy borrowed from domestic criminality for ordinary 
crimes.  It is arguably ill-suited for criminality for atrocity crimes.280  The 
doctrinal insufficiency of this approach is discussed below in greater detail. 
At trial, Fofana was found guilty of aiding and abetting, pursuant to Article 
6(1), for counts 2, 4, and 7 for crimes committed in Tongo.  He was also held 
criminally responsible under Article 6(3) for counts 2, 4, and 7 for crimes 
committed by his subordinates in Koribondo and Bo District as well as for count 
5 in relation to the latter.281  More specifically, Fofana was found to have aided 
and abetted murder and mutilations in Tongo by giving “encouragement” to 
fighters who committed them.282  The CDF Trial Chamber opined that the 
sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR imposed lesser sentences for 
aiding and abetting.  Based on this, it justified a lower penalty for Fofana 
observing that he “only encouraged” the perpetrators but did not give them 
orders to commit such crimes.283  The court’s characterization is generous to say 
the least.  Regarding his liability for the crimes committed by subordinates under 
his control, the judges found that his subordinates’ crimes were large scale and 
“particularly serious” involving extreme brutality, targeted killing of vulnerable 
persons (many who were children and women), and gruesome murders of two 
women by inserting sticks into their “genitals until they come out of their 
mouths.”284  However, Fofana was not present at the scene of these crimes, nor 
                                                                                                                   
 277 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 33. 
 278 Id. ¶ 34. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing 
Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 321, 339 (2004). 
 281 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 45. 
 282 Id. ¶ 50. 
 283 Id. 
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did he order them or aid and abetting in their commission.285  According to the 
Trial Chamber, his criminal responsibility lies in his omission: his failure to 
punish the perpetrators who were under his control.286 
Kondewa, for his part, shot and killed a town leader in Talia and forced 
children into soldiering and killing.  Pursuant to Article 6(1), the Trial Chamber 
convicted him for “committing” murder and using child soldiers under Counts 2 
and 8 respectively.287  In addition, he was also found guilty of aiding and 
abetting the same crimes that Fofana was convicted of in Tongo and for failing 
to prevent crimes in Counts 2, 4, 5 and 7 pursuant to Article 6(3).288  The 
Chamber found that Kondewa humiliated and degraded his victims, assisted in 
committing crimes that were large scale and barbaric, and targeted vulnerable 
women and children.  The children he forced into soldiering were deprived of 
their families, education, and suffered “deep trauma.”289  The crimes committed 
by both Kondewa and Fofana had long-lasting and significant physical and 
psychological impact on the victims and the community.290  
The Trial Chamber also considered factors in aggravation and mitigation.  
The judges began their consideration of aggravating factors by observing that 
ICL sentencing jurisprudence in general recognizes “leadership role of the 
Accused, premeditation and motive, a willing and enthusiastic participation 
in the crime, and the length of time during which the crime was committed” 
as appropriate aggravating factors.291  Moreover, the Trial Chamber correctly 
held when a commander or leader has been found criminally responsible 
under Article 6(1), his leadership position will aggravate his sentence.292  
Moreover, a person’s leadership position can aggravate their punishment in 
other ways.  The CDF Trial Chamber identified “abuse of trust or authority” 
                                                                                                                   
 285 Id. ¶ 50. 
 286 Id. ¶ 51. 
 287 Id. ¶ 52. 
 288 Id. ¶¶ 52–53. 
 289 Id. ¶ 55. 
 290 Id. ¶ 56. 
 291 Id. ¶ 37; Prosecutor v. Jokić, IT-01-42/1-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal ¶¶ 28–29 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, IT-02-
60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 
2003); Prosecutor v. Babić,IT-03-72-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal ¶ 80 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 18, 2005). 
 292 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 38; Prosecutor v.Jokić, IT-01-42/1-A, Judgment on 
Sentencing Appeal ¶¶ 28–29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 30, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Obrenović, IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment ¶ 99 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003); Prosecutor v. Babić,IT-03-72-A, Judgment on Sentencing 
Appeal ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 18, 2005); Prosecutor v. 
Deronjić, IT-02-61-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal ¶ 67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 20, 2005). 
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as an additional way in which leadership position aggravates the sentence.293  
“Trust or authority” is defined as situations “where the Accused was in a 
position that carries with it a duty to protect or defend victims.”294  This 
includes government officials, police chiefs, and commanders, but can also 
include non-official positions of prominence in the community.  Thus, both 
de jure and de facto positions can qualify for this aggravating factor—the 
former viewed primarily as breach of authority and the latter as breach of 
trust.295  
Fofana played a central role in the CDF and held the position of Director 
of War.  From Base Zero, he planned war strategies, selected commanders 
for battle, and issued orders to them.296  As the “overall boss of the 
commanders,” the Trial Chamber found that he held a position of “power and 
authority.”297  Moreover, he was also “the former Chiefdom Speaker” and “a 
community elder.”298  Accordingly, in committing atrocity crimes, Fofana 
failed his duty to protect or defend victims and the court held that he 
“breached a position of trust.”299   
Kondewa was a High Priest of the Kamajors who fought alongside of the 
CDF and held a “unique and prominent position in the community.”300  The 
judges “found that no Kamajor would go to war without his blessing.”301  
They concluded that Kondewa was a superior and held a leadership 
position.302  As a superior who directly committed murder and other atrocity 
crimes, the Trial Chamber determined that Kondewa should receive an 
increased sentence.  The Trial Chamber also found that Kondewa held a 
position of prominence and breached the community’s trust and determined 
this to also be an aggravating factor.303 
In discussing mitigating circumstance, the judges in the CFD case, like 
their colleagues on the bench in other trials, noted that the only factor in 
mitigation that they are required to consider is the accused’s cooperation 
with the prosecution.304 The Chamber, however, noted that it would also 
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consider any expressions of remorse, good character of the accused, any 
good behavior while in detention and help provided to the victims.  Fofana’s 
attorney, Steven Powles,305 made a statement on Fofana’s behalf expressing 
regret for the crimes and suffering inflicted upon the people of Sierra Leone 
during the conflict.  The Trial Chamber accepted his statement as showing 
“empathy” although the accused did not acknowledge his personal 
responsibility for the crimes.  He participated in the peace process after the 
conflict and exhibited good behavior during detention.306  Trial Chamber 
refused to accept “necessity” as a mitigating circumstance since it was not 
argued at trial and no evidence supported it.307  Kondewa made a similar 
statement pleading for mercy but not recognizing his own participation in the 
crimes.  Nevertheless, Trial Chamber accepted his statement as “real and 
sincere.”308  Trial Chamber recognized that neither of the accused had formal 
training to take on the leadership roles and considered this in mitigation.309  
Neither of the accused had prior convictions.310  
The most legally significant element of the CFD trial sentencing 
judgment concerns what role fighting for “a legitimate cause” should have on 
the punishment.311  The Chamber found that the accused were the leaders of 
a fighting force, the CDF and Kamajor, mobilized “to support a legitimate 
cause,” namely to “restore the democratically elected Government of 
President Kabbah which had been illegally ousted through a Coup 
d’Etat . . . by a wing of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces.”312  The judges ruled 
that fighting for a legitimate cause justified mitigation of punishment even if 
the cause was achieved by committing horrendous atrocities and 
international crimes.  According to the Trial Chamber, the forces led by the 
accused helped restore the rule of law by prevailing over the rebellion.313  
These considerations significantly impacted the Trial Chamber’s decision to 
impose lower sentences on Fofana and Kondewa.314 
                                                                                                                   
 305 Steven Powles is a barrister at Doughty Street Chambers specializing in criminal law 
with a focus on international crime and extradition.  Steven Powles, DOUGHTY STREET 
CHAMBERS, http://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/barristers/profile/steven-powles (last visited Dec. 
30, 2014). 
 306 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 67.   
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While the statute of the SCSL directs judges to consider the general 
sentencing practices of the ICTR and national courts of Sierra Leone,315 the 
CDF Trial Chamber, like other trial chambers at the SCSL, dismissed the 
relevance of Sierra Leonean experience and views of punishment.316  The 
judges adopted a very narrow position that Sierra Leonean sentencing law 
and practice is relevant only when the defendant has been convicted of a 
domestic crime found in Article 5 of the court’s statute.317  The Trial 
Chamber explained that while it would consider, as mandated by the statute, 
the sentencing practices of the ICTR, it would also refer to practices of the 
ICTY if appropriate.318  In reality, however, the SCSL judges cited and 
referenced to the ICTY sentencing jurisprudence far more often than ICTR 
cases.  The Trial Chamber warned, however, that the use of the sentencing 
practices of these tribunals might be limited because they impose “global 
sentences” that do not indicate the specific sentence for each individual 
crime imposed.319  Moreover, the Chamber noted that many of the sentences 
at the ICTR were imposed for genocide, a crime not within the jurisdiction of 
the SCSL.320  The Chamber further explained that the SCSL statute does not 
provide for capital punishment or life sentences and refused the 
prosecution’s urging that it impose either of these sentences.321 
The Trial Chamber concluded that a “manifestly repressive sentence” 
would not serve the goal of deterrence and would be “counterproductive to 
the Sierra Leonean society” because it would not help achieve peace, justice 
or reconciliation.322  Thus, Fofana and Kondewa received very lenient 
punishments compared to other war criminals before the SCSL.  Fofana and 
Kondewa received imprisonment terms of six and eight years respectively, 
and received full credit for time spent in custody.323  Despite the meager 
punishments for the pro-Kabbah fighters, the judges still hoped that the 
judgment would serve “to send a message to future pro-democracy armed 
forces or militia groups that notwithstanding the justness or propriety of their 
cause, they must observe the laws of war.”324   
                                                                                                                   
 315 SCSL Statute, art. 19(1). 
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The Appeals Chamber revised upwards both Fofana and Kendowa’s 
sentences for war crimes in counts 2, 4 and 5.325  For the war crimes of 
murder and inhumane acts, the appeals judges increased Fofana’s prison 
sentences from six years to fifteen years imprisonment and Kendowa’s from 
eight to twenty years.326  For the crime of pillage, the Appeals Chamber 
increased Fofana’s prison sentence from three years to five years, and 
increased Kendowa’s punishment from five to seven years.327  It also 
reversed their acquittals for murder and, a crime against humanity, and 
entered new penalties of fifteen years for Fofana and twenty years for 
Kondewa.328  In the end, the Appeals Chamber ordered that Fofana shall 
serve a total term of imprisonment of fifteen years, up nine years from his 
sentence at trial of six years.329  It likewise ordered Kondewa to serve a total 
prison term of twenty years, a twelve year increase from the Trial Chamber’s 
eight year sentence.330  The Appeals Chamber ordered all sentences for both 
perpetrators to run concurrently.331  
The Appeals Chamber strongly disagreed with the Trial Chamber’s 
findings that the accused deserved sentencing reductions on the grounds that 
they acted to “restore democracy to Sierra Leone.”332  The Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the “Trial Chamber made an error of law by considering ‘just 
cause’ and motives of civic duty as a mitigating factor.333  In the Appeals 
Chamber’s view, these factors impermissibly became the primary factors 
influencing the trial judges’ sentence.  The Appeals Chamber emphasized 
that a primary consideration of international sentencing should be “the 
revulsion of mankind, represented by the international community, to the 
crime and not the tolerance by a local community of the crime; or lack of 
public revulsion in relation to the crimes of such community; or local 
sentiments about the persons who have been found guilty of the crimes.”334  
The Appeals Chamber found no error with the other sentencing factors taken 
into consideration by the Trial Chamber.  
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TABLE 4:  CHARGES, CONVICTION, AND APPEAL SUMMARY FOR CDF DEFENDANTS 
IV.  THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE’S SENTENCING LEGACY 
The SCSL’s sentencing legacy can be assessed from multiple 
perspectives.  This section systematizes the sentencing jurisprudence, 
identifies important contributions of the SCSL to the emerging body of 
sentencing law in ICL, and examines how sentencing judgments construct 
narratives that shape official understandings and general perceptions about 
the war in Sierra Leone and accountability for atrocities.  As noted above, the 
SCSL Statute’s sentencing provisions are minimal: 
 
 
 
 
CRIMINAL CHARGES IN CDF TRIAL FOFANA TC 
FOFANA AC 
UPHELD? 
KONDEWA 
TC 
KONDEWA AC 
UPHELD? 
COUNT 1: Murder as CAH NG Reversed 15 years NG 
Reversed 
20 years 
COUNT 2: Murder as WC 6 years 
Y 
increased to 
15 years 
8 years 
Y 
increased to 
20 years 
COUNT 3: Inhumane acts as CAH NG Reversed 15 years NG 
Reversed 
20 years 
COUNT 4: Violence to life, health and physical 
or mental well-being of persons, in particular 
cruel treatment as WC 
6 years 
Y 
increased to 
15 years 
8 years 
Y 
increased to 
20 years 
COUNT 5: Pillage as a WC 3 years 
Y 
increased to 
5 years 
5 years 
Y 
increased to 
7 years 
COUNT 6: Act of terrorism as a WC NG NG NG NG 
COUNT 7: Collective punishments as WC 4 years Reversed NG 6 years 
Reversed 
NG 
COUNT 8: Enlisting children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or groups or using them 
to participate actively in hostilities as WC 
NG NG 7 years Reversed NG 
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ARTICLE 19: PENALTIES 
1.  The Trial Chamber shall impose upon a convicted person, 
other than a juvenile offender, imprisonment for a specified 
number of years. In determining the terms of imprisonment, 
the Trial Chamber shall, as appropriate, have recourse to the 
practice regarding prison sentences in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the national courts of 
Sierra Leone. 
2.  In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chamber should take 
into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and 
the individual circumstances of the convicted person. 
3.  In addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chamber may order 
the forfeiture of the property, proceeds and any assets 
acquired unlawfully or by criminal conduct, and their return 
to their rightful owner or to the State of Sierra Leone.335 
The law of sentencing at SCSL is modeled after the sentencing provisions 
of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.336  The SCSL 
statute empowers international judges with broad discretion in fixing 
punishment, despite the fact that this approach failed to produce a coherent 
sentencing practice at other international criminal courts.337  One novel 
aspect of Article 19 is the explicit reference to the sentencing practice of 
another international criminal court, the ICTR, as an appropriate source of 
sentencing law, and the deliberate exclusion of the ICTY’s sentencing 
jurisprudence.  Both the sentencing process and penalty allocations of the 
ICTY have come under heavy criticism for being unprincipled, unjustly 
lenient, and inconsistent.338  Regarding the role of national law, the 
qualification “as appropriate” in Article 19, subparagraph 1, does not appear 
in sentencing provisions of other international tribunals, which plainly 
directed that “the Trial Chambers shall have recourse” to national law.339  
                                                                                                                   
 335 SCSL Statute, art. 19. 
 336 ICTR Statute, art. 23; ICTY Statute, art. 24. 
 337 See generally Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary 
Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 683 (2007). 
 338 Id.; Shahram Dana, The Limits of Judicial Idealism: Should the International Criminal 
Court Engage with Consequentialist Aspirations?, 3 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFAIRS 30 (2014). 
 339 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 24, 
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf; United 
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This is most likely a direct response to censure of international judges for 
exceeding their authority and contravening the law of their tribunals by 
declaring that compliance with national sentencing law and practice is 
discretionary.340 
Drawing upon Part III’s analysis of the sentencing jurisprudence, the 
following quantitative picture emerges: The SCSL has imposed nine 
sentences ranging from fifteen years to fifty-two years with an average 
sentence of thirty-six years and median of forty-five years imprisonment.  
The average sentence for opponents of the government is forty-six years, and 
the average sentence for supporters of the government (CDF defendants) is 
17.5 years.  The CDF defendants also received the lowest individual 
sentences.  Among the opposition groups, the AFRC was punished most 
severely with an average sentence of 48.3 years, comprising of individual 
sentences of fifty years for Brima and Kanu, and forty-five years for 
Kamara.341  The average punishment for the RUF defendants was thirty-nine 
years.342  Sesay received a prison sentenced of fifty-two years, the highest 
individual punishment rendered by the SCSL.343  His RUF co-defendants 
Kallon and Gbao received forty and twenty-five years respectively.344  All 
perpetrators convicted by the SCSL are serving their prison sentences in 
Mpanga Prison, Rwanda,345 except for Charles Taylor who will serve his 
sentence in a more comfortable and hygienic prison cell in the United 
Kingdom.346   
                                                                                                                   
 340 See generally, e.g., Dana, supra note 5 (arguing that the watering down of this provision 
violated both the express language of this provision and its stated object and purpose).  
 341 See AFRC Appeal Judgment ¶ 22. 
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Jalloh, supra note 2, at 409.  For a discussion of the difficulty with enforcement of SCSL 
sentences see Roisin Mulgrew, On the Enforcement of Sentences Imposed by International 
Courts: Challenges Faced by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 373 
(2009). 
 346 U.K. tax payers will pick up the costs of his imprisonment to the tune of £80,000 per year.  
Warlord Charles Taylor Arrives in Britain to Serve 50-Year Sentence for Sierra Leone War 
Crimes, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2461032/Charles-
Taylor-arrives-Britain-serve-50-year-sentence-Sierra-Leone-war-crimes.html. 
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A.  Systematizing the Sentencing Jurisprudence 
1. Punishment Philosophy 
The SCSL generally identifies punitive rationales as the appropriate 
measure of sentencing allocation.347  Its first sentencing judgment declared 
that “it is settled law that the goals and objectives” of international 
sentencing for atrocity crimes “derive essentially from the doctrines 
underlying penal sanctions in the domestic or national law setting.”348  Thus, 
SCSL considered the penology underlying national criminal justice for 
ordinary crimes as the appropriate source from which to construct a 
philosophical framework for international sentencing for atrocity crimes.349  
Consequently, the SCSL judges saw little justification in getting entangled 
with objectives purportedly unique to ICL, such as reconciliation, historical 
record building, or didactic and expressive functions, when determining 
sentencing allocations.350  This may explain its practice of imposing more 
severe sentences than other international tribunals.  Although, as will be 
considered in subsequent sections below, the higher sentences at the SCSL 
might be attributable to factors beyond law and penal philosophy.   
All sentencing judgments identify retribution and deterrence as the 
primary goals of ICL sentencing.351  The judges are fairly consistent in 
describing retribution as “duly expressing the outrage of the international 
community at these crimes.”352  They are careful to distance retribution from 
the notion of revenge.353  As for deterrence ideology, the SCSL holds that the 
goal of deterrence also influences sentencing allocations.  In the judges’ 
view, “the penalties imposed by the Trial Chamber must be sufficient to 
deter others from committing similar crimes.”354 
The SCSL judges acknowledge that other objectives, such as prevention, 
rehabilitation, stigmatization, reconciliation, and norm building are found in 
                                                                                                                   
 347 See AFRC Appeal Judgment ¶ 308; CDF Appeal Judgment ¶ 532; RUF Appeal Judgment 
¶ 1229; Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 79; RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 13. 
 348 RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 12. 
 349 Id.  
 350 See Dana, supra note 338 (discussing the impact of these considerations on ICL 
sentencing). 
 351 E.g., Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 13; CDF Appeal Judgment ¶ 532; RUF Sentencing 
Judgment ¶ 13.  
 352 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 26.  
 353 See AFRC Sentencing Judgment ¶ 15; CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 26; RUF Sentencing 
Judgment ¶ 13; Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 13. 
 354 See AFRC Sentencing Judgment ¶ 16; RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 13; Taylor Sentencing 
Judgment ¶ 14. 
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ICL sentencing jurisprudence but they stop short of adopting them as 
relevant consideration for sentencing allocations.355  For example, regarding 
the role of rehabilitation as a sentencing factor in ICL, the SCSL in its 
maiden sentencing judgment acknowledged that the past jurisprudence of the 
ICTR and ICTY regularly identified rehabilitation as a factor.356  However, 
the SCSL immediately moved away from this position, holding that 
rehabilitation is more appropriate as a goal in relation to ordinary criminality 
in the domestic context and less relevant as a sentencing factor in 
international criminal trials.357  Subsequent judgments followed the same 
general approach toward rehabilitation,358 although the CDF Trial Chamber 
presented a confused treatment of it.   
The CDF trial judges initially elevated the role of rehabilitation in 
influencing sentencing allocations to the same level as retribution and 
deterrence, positioning rehabilitation as one of the main purposes of 
international criminal justice.359  However, two paragraphs later in the 
judgment, the judges turned around and declared that “rehabilitation . . . is of 
greater importance in domestic jurisdictions than in International Criminal 
Tribunals.”360  The CDF judges appear to be inarticulately repeating generic 
statements about rehabilitation found in other ICL judgments without really 
contemplating or integrating the concepts into their sentencing analysis and 
allocations.361 Ultimately, the judges in the CDF case appear to be more 
committed to their initial position that placed rehabilitation on par with 
retribution and deterrence as a primary purpose of ICL punishment.  
This focus on rehabilitation indicates that the CDF Trial Chamber’s 
sentences were influenced by restorative considerations more so than 
punitive considerations.  This is not surprising given the popular social 
narratives in Sierra Leone society eulogizing the CDF defendants as national 
heroes. Moreover, as discussed in detail below, the CDF Trial Chamber’s 
restorative orientation limited the influence of the gravity of the crime in its 
sentencing allocations.  Although the judges are not explicit about this, it is 
reasonable to deduce that their restorative philosophy shaped their views on 
aggravating and mitigating factors, for example, the unprecedented and 
                                                                                                                   
 355 E.g., RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶¶ 14–16. 
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 358 See RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 16. 
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ultimately erroneous treatment of “legitimate cause” as a mitigating factor.    
The actual sentences imposed by the trial judges in the CDF case further 
reveal the influence of restorative ideology: Fofana and Kondewa were 
sentenced to six and eight years respectively, while the average sentence for 
opponents of the government is forty-six years.362  However, the Appeals 
Chamber firmly disavowed this attempt to place rehabilitation on par with 
retribution and deterrence.363  The judges on appeal increased the defendant’s 
sentences to fifteen and twenty years imprisonment.364 
Some SCSL judges, like those at the ICTR and ICTY, conflated the goals 
of international prosecutions in general with the justifications and aims of 
sentencing in particular.365 At times, what is better understood as an 
important, even desirable, possible outcome of international criminal justice 
mechanisms is treated as a sentencing factor.366  For example, judges 
frequently discuss the didactic or expressive function of international 
prosecutions as a “goal” or “function” of punishment, suggesting that it has a 
bearing on sentencing allocations.367  In the CDF, AFRC, Taylor, and RUF 
cases, the trial chambers formalistically stated that the goal of 
“influenc[ing] . . . legal awareness” is a “main purpose of a sentence.”368  
The Taylor Trial Chamber opined that one of the main purposes of a 
sentence is to “influence the legal awareness of the accused, the surviving 
victims, their relatives, the witnesses and the general public in order to 
reassure them that the legal system is implemented and 
                                                                                                                   
 362 See supra TABLES 1–4, at pp. 631, 639, 644, 657. 
 363 CDF Appeal Judgment ¶ 489. 
 364 See supra TABLE 1, at p. 631. 
 365 Dana, supra note 338, at 47. 
 366 See CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶¶ 28, 30; AFRC Trial Sentencing Judgment ¶ 16; Taylor 
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enforced. . . . Sentencing is intended to convey the message that globally 
accepted laws and rules have to be accepted by everyone.”369 Yet, this 
didactic function can be achieved merely by prosecution and some 
punishment.  Ascribing to it does not inform the decision maker about how 
much punishment is appropriate or what a fair sentence would be.  Even if 
influencing legal awareness is accepted as a “main” function of sentencing, it 
is does not guide the exercise of sentencing discretion, nor does it inform 
sentencing allocations.  It does not tell us whether the perpetrator ought to 
get fifty years or twenty-five years.  It would be difficult to claim that a 
higher penalty generates more awareness compared to a lower penalty.  
Thus, the language of sentencing judgments should avoid conflating the 
possible functions of international criminal justice mechanisms with 
principles that can in fact guide sentencing.  Likewise, in the sentencing 
discourse itself, the justification for punishment and the aims of punishment 
should be kept distinct.    
2.  Constitutive Sentencing Considerations 
Drawing on the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
SCSL’s sentencing jurisprudence uniformly identifies four constitutive 
determinants central to identifying a just punishment: (1) gravity of the 
offense; (2) individual circumstances of the accused; (3) applicable 
aggravating and mitigating factors; and (4) where appropriate, the sentencing 
principles found in the practice of the ICTR and Sierra Leone.370  In practice, 
however, the SCSL judges unimaginatively and uniformly collapse 
categories two (individual circumstances) and three (aggravating and 
mitigating factors).371  As this article develops, this unexplained merger 
                                                                                                                   
 369 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 16 (quoting Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, 
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represents a missed opportunity to develop a sentencing framework sui 
generis to international criminal law.   
  a.  Unpacking Gravity: A Colorless Litmus Test 
The SCSL holds that the “gravity of the offence” is the primary 
consideration in determining an appropriate sentence.372   Judges declare it to 
be the key differential principle—the “litmus test”—of sentencing 
allocations.373  The judges at the SCSL followed the general ICL practice of 
cataloging a list of “gravity” factors.374  Depending on which judgment is 
examined, the list runs anywhere between six to eight factors including  (1) 
the “scale” of the offenses committed; (2) their “brutality”; (3) the temporal 
scope of the crime; (4) the “role of the Accused” in their commission; (5) the 
“number of victims”; (6) the “degree of suffering” or impact of the crime on 
the immediate victim; (7) the crime’s “effect on relatives” of the victim; and 
(8) the “vulnerability” of victims.375  This approach, while consistent with 
the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, does not propel the quality of ICL 
sentencing.   
The SCSL judges generally did not engage in the challenge of 
conceptualizing gravity in terms of theory or doctrine.  This is not merely an 
academic exercise; the absence of a theoretical conceptualization of gravity 
has problematized ICL sentencing practice in several ways.  First, as a 
practical matter, the failure to adequately conceptualize gravity may explain 
why ICL judges frequently vacillate between treating a particular factor as a 
gravity factor in one judgment, but as an aggravating factor in another.  Since 
gravity and aggravating factors are not of equal weight in sentencing 
allocations, whether a factor is treated as the former or the latter may have a 
dissimilar impact on the sentence.  The jurisprudential rhetoric suggests as 
much: “gravity” is the “litmus test” of a fair sentence, not aggravating 
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factors.376  Conceptual distinction between gravity factors and aggravating 
factors takes on greater significance before the ICC as demonstrated in 
Lubanga’s sentencing.377   
Of course, whether the sentencing practice lives up to the rhetoric is 
debatable, and herein lies a second problem: an examination of the actual 
sentences and the judges’ reasoned opinions challenges the mantra that 
gravity is the litmus test of punishment allocations.  A comparative analysis 
of Sesay and Gboa’s sentences demonstrates the explanatory gap.  Sesay and 
Gbao were convicted of crimes of similar gravity.  For instance, both were 
convicted under Count 6 of the indictment for rape as a crime against 
humanity.378  Yet, for that offense, Sesay was sentenced to forty-five years of 
imprisonment.  Gbao received only fifteen years, a third of Sesay’s 
punishment.379  Thus, it is hard to accept that gravity is what determined their 
respective punishments given that both were convicted of rape as a crime 
against humanity.  Of course, one could attempt to explain the difference by 
accounting for various aggravating and mitigating factors, assuming there is 
any difference in this regard.  Nevertheless, even conceding for the sake of 
argument that there is some difference in their aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, this explanation attempts to account for a 300% difference in 
the sentences.  If aggravating and mitigating factors are in fact responsible 
for 300% increase in punishment for the same crime, it can hardly be said 
that gravity is the litmus test.  
Moreover, far from being the primary sentencing consideration, the 
punishment of certain defendants suggests that gravity of the crimes played 
little role comparatively in their sentencing.  For example, the CDF Trial 
Chamber conceptualized gravity as an “important principle” rather than the 
primary factor or “litmus test” for sentencing as it was applied in the RUF, 
AFRC, and Taylor cases.380  This subtle shift is not trivial or accidental but a 
predictable flow from the trial chamber’s restorative orientation and 
treatment of rehabilitation as a primary purpose of ICL sentencing alongside 
decisively punitive purposes, such as retribution and deterrence.  It casts 
doubt on whether “gravity” of the offense is the controlling consideration for 
ICL punishments. 
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The Taylor Sentencing Judgment provided a glimmer of an attempt 
toward some conceptualization of gravity.  It contributes an important 
nuance relevant to the future practice of the International Criminal Court and 
ICL sentencing in general.  This nuance concerns the notion of inherent 
gravity.381  The Taylor Trial Chamber discusses two aspects of the alleged 
criminality as integral to assessing “gravity of the offense”: “the inherent 
gravity of the crime and the criminal conduct of the accused.”382  Regarding 
the former, determining “inherent” gravity calls for an abstract assessment of 
the seriousness of the elements of the crime; whereas the second aspect 
draws in a factual assessment of the perpetrator’s mode of liability. 
Unfortunately, the Taylor Trial Chamber did not actually engage in an 
assessment of the inherent gravity of the crime.  Instead, it reverted to a 
gravity-in-fact analysis of the crime by considering the applicability of each 
gravity factor, enumerated above, one by one.383 
  b.  Individual Circumstances & Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: 
Rebuilding Collapsed Categories 
All SCSL sentencing judgments, both trial and appeals, identify “individual 
circumstances of the accused” as an independent sentencing consideration, 
separate and distinct from aggravating and mitigating factors.384  In practice, 
however, judges routinely collapsed these two categories in their sentencing 
analysis, despite the fact that they enumerated them as separate considerations 
when laying out the applicable legal framework.385  This gross analytical 
deficiency accents a deep automatism in ICL judicial sentencing discourse.  
Consequentially, “individual circumstances of the accused” has 
unimaginatively become a dumping ground for aggravating and mitigating 
factors.  In my opinion, this collapse represents a lost opportunity to develop a 
sophisticated sui generis penology for ICL.  My theory seizes upon this lost 
opportunity and also gives sentencing judgments a voice capable of linking to 
broader narratives about atrocity crimes, responsibility, human nature, and 
war. 
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Regarding aggravating circumstances, the SCSL has followed the 
sentencing practice of ad hoc tribunals in holding a number of factors as 
aggravating, such as superior position, abuse of power, betrayal of trust, 
exploitation of war for personal financial gain, excessive brutality, attacking 
traditional places of sanctuary, and more.386  However, the absence of a 
strong analytical sentencing framework has problematized the application of 
these factors.  For example, as noted above, the Trial Chamber increased 
Taylor’s punishment based on several aggravating circumstances: his 
leadership role; his special status as Head of State; his betrayal of trust; the 
extraterritorial reach of his crimes; and his exploitation of war for personal 
financial gain.387  According to Professor Kevin Jon Heller, the judges’ 
sentencing analysis here falls short of sufficiently distinguishing the first 
three aggravating factors, suggesting discernable error due to double 
counting.388  For example, regarding betrayal of public trust as an 
aggravating factor, Taylor abused his position, authority, and power over 
“state machinery and public resources,”389 including military assets, to assist 
in the commission of atrocity crimes.  This same type of abuse of authority is 
germane to the judges’ justification for aggravating his sentence on the 
account of his “leadership role” and “status as Head of State.”390   
On the other hand, the judges arguably correctly appreciated that these 
three factors—leadership role, crimes by a Head of State, and betrayal of 
trust—have converged to aggregately enhance both Taylor’s culpability and 
the harms resulting from his wrongful conduct in a way that the combined 
damage is more than each factor could inflict in isolation.  The judges 
sensibly understand and recognize that this warrants a more severe 
punishment, but the ICL sentencing framework is insufficient to capture and 
logically account for this form of criminality.  Consequently, observers 
interpret the sentencing judgment as flawed for double counting or emotively 
fixating on status.391  Adding to the confusion is the judges’ imprecise 
language, which blurs the line between “gravity” considerations and 
aggravating factors.392   
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Perhaps it is not surprising that absent an articulated sentencing 
framework, a coherent theory, and a more exacting analysis, some 
commentators attributed the SCSL’s fifty year sentencing of Taylor as the 
product of a “fetish” with Head of State status rather than sound sentencing 
principles.393  But even if reasonable minds disagree on the soundness of 
permitting a “leadership” position to aggravate a perpetrator’s punishment in 
more than one way, to attribute this approach to a “fetish” with Head of State 
status ignores the rest of the court’s sentencing jurisprudence.  In fact, this 
approach by the SCSL was not unique to Taylor.  For example, in the CDF 
case, when a Kamajor leader was found criminally responsible under Article 
6(1), the Trial Chamber considered multiple ways in which his leadership 
position could aggravate his sentence.394  Thus, far from fixating the 
application of this principle on Charles Taylor because he was a Head of 
State, the SCSL applies this approach (whether correct or erroneous) to 
government officials, police chiefs, commanders, and significantly, also to 
non-official positions of prominence in the community.  Thus, both de jure 
and de facto positions can qualify for this aggravating factor—the former 
viewed primarily as breach of authority and the latter as breach of trust.  
Regarding mitigating factors, the SCSL essentially follows the general 
ICL jurisprudence.  Mitigating factors need not be related to the offense.395  
Exercising their wide discretion, the SCSL judges have held a number of 
factors to constitute mitigating circumstances: expression of remorse;396 good 
character with no prior conviction;397 acknowledgment of responsibility;398 
the accused’s lack of education or training;399 advanced age of the 
accused;400 duress;401 indirect participation,402 and “legitimate cause.”403  The 
latter two are particularly problematic conceptually and theoretically.  In 
other cases, the court’s method of analysis and application of an otherwise 
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conceptually sound mitigating factor raises concerns or exposes doctrinal 
deficiencies. 
Treating “indirect participation” as a mitigating factor unsettles the 
sentencing matrix because, under the SCSL’s approach, the accused’s mode 
of liability is already accounted for in its assessment of gravity of the 
offense.  The SCSL’s treatment of remorse is likewise problematic.  The 
SCSL judges were comfortable mitigating an accused’s punishment on the 
basis of remorse, even where the expression of remorse was tainted with 
persistent denial of responsibility.404  It is highly questionably whether an 
expression of remorse meets the requirements of “genuine and sincere” when 
it comes without accepting responsibility for the wrongdoing.  Under this 
approach, remorse as a mitigating factor is largely indistinguishable from 
sadness felt by a layperson reading a newspaper report on atrocities.  
Moreover, applying remorse in this manner is not supported by any 
philosophical justification. 
The ruling is especially misplaced if we consider the fact that the SCSL 
held bifurcated guilt and sentencing proceedings.  Given that the accused at 
the time of the sentencing hearing has already been found guilty by a court of 
law, the perpetrator who professes remorse while denying wrongdoing and 
personal responsibility is effectively continuing to challenge the court’s 
findings that he has acted wrongfully and caused grave harms to many 
victims.  It appears to be the antithesis of remorse.  This raises the important 
question: what does the perpetrator have to be remorseful about?  It also 
fundamentally challenges the veracity of remorse as a weighty mitigating 
factor.  
Perhaps more significant in relation to the maturation of ICL sentencing 
principles and law is how uncritical and unimaginative judicial opinions, 
intended for the public, on punishment and sentencing have become in 
international criminal justice.  They reveal a concerning level of divorce 
between the law as stated and its application and between optimal policy and 
legal principles.  For example, the SCSL judges draw upon some ICTY 
judgments to credulously incorporate into their own jurisprudence the notion 
to mitigate punishment on the purported grounds of remorse, even in the face 
of denial of wrongdoing.  Further, they do so without any reflection on 
optimal institutional policy or consideration of variations in their respective 
procedural rules.  For example, the fact that some ICTY trial chambers 
allowed mitigation for remorse in the absence of acceptance of responsibility 
should be understood in light of the fact that ICTY proceeding did not 
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separate the trial and sentencing phases.405  Since the defense would have to 
present any claim for sentencing mitigation grounded on remorse prior to the 
court’s determination of guilt, the judges had no choice but to broaden the 
notion of remorse if they desired to retain it as a mitigating factor.  Given 
that the SCSL held separate sentencing hearings after a finding of guilty, 
replicating this approach in the SCSL’s sentencing practice is unnecessary, if 
not unjustified. 
3.  Contributions to the Law of Sentencing in ICL 
The SCSL’s contributions to ICL sentencing can be broadly grouped into 
two categories: crystallization of ICL sentencing law and new developments.  
ICL sentencing philosophy continues to lack cohesion but is crystalizing as 
having a more punitive orientation than a restorative one.  With the 
contribution of the SCSL, retribution and deterrence are in full ascendency 
over other ideological approaches to ICL sentencing.  Other international 
tribunals, particularly the ICTY, advanced numerous and conflicting 
rationales for ICL sentencing.  In addition to retribution and deterrence, 
judges at the ad hoc tribunals also claimed that the purposes of ICL 
sentencing include reconciliation, rehabilitation, general affirmative 
prevention, expressivism, historical recording building, and more.406 
Moreover, the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals go beyond identifying 
these various ideologies as achievable goals of international prosecutions, 
but they also considered them fundamentally to be factors that can influence 
sentence allocations.  Thus, the SCSL significantly contributed towards 
settling international criminal law sentencing on retributive and deterrence 
punishment rationales.  The SCSL generally identifies punitive rationales as 
the appropriate measure of sentencing allocations.407  A few trial judges 
departed from this and placed rehabilitation on equal footing with retribution 
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and deterrence,408 but it was promptly reorientated back to a primary focus 
on the latter two principles by the Appeals Chamber.409  
The SCSL jurisprudence also solidifies some general principles of 
international criminal law; some are drawn directly from general principles 
of law in national jurisdictions.410  Some examples include: (1) where a 
factor has already been taken into consideration in assessing the gravity of 
the offence, it cannot be considered as an additional aggravating factor and 
vice versa;411 (2) if a factor is an element of the underlying crime, it cannot 
be used as an aggravating factor;412 (3) aggravating factors must be related to 
the commission of the offense;413 (4) mitigating circumstances need only be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence;414 (5) mitigating circumstances 
need not be related to the offense;415 and (6) aggravating factors must be 
established beyond the reasonable doubt.416  In some instances, the SCSL 
goes beyond mere rule articulation but also declares these principles to be 
general principles of international criminal law.  Significantly, the ICC 
followed the same rules in its discussion of aggravating factors in its first 
sentencing judgment.417  
The SCSL sentencing legacy also includes important rulings on the nexus 
between modes of liability and sentencing.  In its final judgment, the SCSL 
held that domestic and international criminal law do not support the finding 
that, as a matter of general principle, aiding and abetting warrants a lesser 
sentence than more direct forms of participation.  The court refused to 
introduce a hierarchy of modes of liability for the purpose of sentencing, just 
as the judges at the ad hoc tribunals declined to impose a hierarchy of crimes.  
This is not surprising as any such ruling would curtail the wide discretion 
ICL judges enjoy in sentencing matters, a discretion they guard very 
watchfully.  Previously, the Taylor Trial Chamber had painted itself into a 
corner by erroneously declaring that “aiding and abetting as a mode of 
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liability generally warrants a lesser sentence,”418 but yet handed out a fifty 
year sentence on par with direct perpetrators in the RUF and AFRC trials.  In 
a somewhat unconvincing manner, the trial chamber then subsequently 
attempted to justify its departure from the rule it just stated by relying on the 
“unique circumstances of this case.”419   
The sentencing judgment, however, would have benefitted from 
explaining this point more clearly.  The judges could have strengthened their 
position by noting that the argument that “aiding and abetting warrants a 
lesser sentence” does not apply to planning, ordering, and possibly even 
instigating atrocity crimes (depending on the facts) because ICL 
jurisprudence treats these as separate and distinct modes of liability,420 even 
though in a particular sense they might also amount to assisting in the 
commission of a crime.  Neither “planning” nor “ordering” as a mode of 
liability requires, sensu stricto, the actual commission of the crime.  Thus, a 
broad stroke calling for lesser punishment for aiders and abettors based on a 
presumed notion that such culpability is less serious is misplaced in the 
context of ICL and atrocity crimes.  Likewise, the judges could have further 
strengthened their holding by relying on the “enabler responsibility” 
theory421 to close the explanatory gap between their ruling on aiding and 
abetting and their fifty year sentence (the second highest handed down by the 
SCSL). 
In addition to contributing to the solidification of ICL sentencing law and 
principles, the SCSL also makes innovative contributions to the 
jurisprudence.  For example, SCSL was the first international criminal court 
to treat as an aggravating factor a Head of State’s use of power to engage in 
extraterritorial crimes.422  The harm here goes beyond public international 
law concerns regarding state sovereignty.  Taylor’s criminality contributed 
decisively to sustaining and enabling the commission of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.  Thus, when such extraterritorial criminality is 
committed by a person in control of a foreign state’s armed forces or military 
                                                                                                                   
 418 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 21 (emphasis added) (overruled on appeal.  See Taylor 
Appeal Judgment.). 
 419 Id. 
 420 SCSL Statute, art, 6(1); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25, opened 
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; Updated Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7(1), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal% 
20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf; United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 
Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda (with Annexed Statute), art. 6(1), S.C. res. 
955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 421 See infra Part V.C. 
 422 Taylor Sentencing Judgment ¶ 27. 
2014] THE SENTENCING LEGACY OF THE SCSL  673 
 
resources, it appears reasonable to treat the extraterritorial nature of that 
person’s crimes as an aggravating factor.  The court’s ruling should not be 
viewed as a go around the principle of legality to punish Taylor for the crime 
of aggression, which is not within the court’s jurisdiction.  Before this factor 
can be triggered to aggravate the sentence, the accused criminal liability for a 
crime within the court’s jurisdiction must first be established.  In Charles 
Taylor’s case, however, extraterritorial criminality as an aggravating factor 
cannot alone explain the substantially higher sentence.  The sharp increase is 
better explained by the enabler responsibility theory, discussed further 
below. 
The Taylor Trial Chamber also contributes an important nuance to our 
understanding of “gravity” for the purpose of sentencing.  It conceptualizes 
“gravity of the offense” as the combined severity of two aspects of the 
alleged criminality: “the inherent gravity of the crime and the criminal 
conduct of the accused.”423  Determining “inherent” gravity calls for an 
abstract assessment of the seriousness of the elements of the crime; whereas 
the second aspect draws in a factual assessment of the perpetrator’s mode of 
liability.  To positively utilize this conceptualization of gravity, however, 
requires an adjustment in how judges narrate their sentencing opinions.  The 
formulistic recitations of a list of enumerated fact-based gravity factors of 
general applicability must be replaced with a gravity assessment of the 
elements of the crime.  This is after all what an “inherent” examination calls 
for.  Likewise, the proper application of this conceptualization of gravity 
requires clarity in the conceptualization of the modes of liability.424  Another 
contribution of the SCSL is a tacit acceptance of institutional limitations of 
international criminal justice mechanisms.  The sentencing practice of the 
SCSL implies judicial acceptance of limitations of the punitive model for 
transitional justice, recognizing that international criminal courts have 
limited capacity for large-scale social engineering. 
B.  The Misconceived Notion of Global Sentence 
A “global sentence” refers to situations in which the accused is convicted 
of multiple crimes, but the judges issue only a single aggregate sentence 
without first imposing and articulating individual sentences for each 
conviction prior to rendering a final overall sentence.  Global sentencing was 
introduced into the modern practice of international criminal justice in 
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violation of then existing tribunal rules.425  Global sentencing is also contrary 
to general principles of law arising from national penal law and practice.  
Significantly, global sentencing is also inconsistent with Sierra Leone’s 
criminal laws.426 
Moreover, in 1998, when the ICC statute was finalized, states definitively 
disavowed the notion of global sentencing for ICL sentencing and ended it.  
The ICC statute prohibits global sentencing.427  The negotiations and drafting 
history of the ICC statute, as reflected in the travaux préparatoires of the 
Rome Treaty, indicate that there was no objection or disagreement with the 
requirement of rendering individual sentences, and thereby eliminating the 
practice of global sentencing.  This suggests that pronouncing individual 
sentences for each conviction is not only a general principle of law, but also 
a norm of customary international law for imposing individual criminal 
responsibility.  Although the practice of global sentencing was discredited, 
some SCSL judges subsequently opted to continue it.  Thus, the SCSL is 
split on the appropriateness of global sentencing for atrocity crimes.  Judges 
in the RUF and CDF trials issued individual penalties for each crime before 
ordering a total sentencing against the accused for all his crimes.  In the 
Taylor case and the AFRC case, judges imposed only a single global 
sentence.  The practice of global sentencing inhibits the maturation of 
international sentencing and makes punishment less transparent.  It also 
arguably denies both the prosecutor and the defendant the right to an 
effective review of the trial sentence.  Specifically, in the case of Charles 
Taylor, had the Trial Chamber imposed individual sentences for each 
conviction, we could better understand to what degree “aiding and abetting” 
influenced his penalty as compared to “planning.”    
In sum, global sentencing is unsound as a matter of criminal law policy 
and contrary to international standards.  It is at odds with general principles 
of criminal law, the understanding and practice of the international 
community as adopted in the Rome Treaty, and the criminal law of the Sierra 
Leone.  For these reasons, the continued application of global sentencing by 
some SCSL judges constitutes a shortcoming in the court’s legacy.  
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C.  Missed Opportunities to Localize International Justice 
The SCSL largely ignored Sierra Leonean approaches to punishment, and 
even sidelined the ICTR jurisprudence, in favor of an obsession with the way 
the ICTY does things.  For example, the AFRC sentencing judgment cites 
the ICTY fifty-two times and the ICTR only five times.428  The SCSL judges 
are constantly citing the European located court, and when they are not doing 
that, they are citing the Canadian Supreme Court and its “learned justice.”429  
Regarding their treatment of Sierra Leonean perspectives, the SCSL took the 
narrow position that Sierra Leonean sentencing law and practice is relevant 
only when the defendant has been convicted of a domestic crime found in 
Article 5 of the court’s statute.430  Since Fofana and Kondewa were not 
convicted or indicted under Article 5, the judges refused to consider any 
aspect of Sierra Leonean sentencing law.   
Such a narrow approach to Article 19’s incorporation and reference to the 
national experience is not supported by a textual and teleological 
understanding of the SCSL’s statute.  In fact, it runs counter to both.  Their 
approach is also inconsistent with how other international tribunals have 
interpreted similar national law provisions in their statutes.431  The ICTY and 
ICTR held that the domestic approach to punishment and local practice 
regarding prison sentences was at least guidance to the judges, even if not 
binding.432  They took national sentencing law into account even though their 
statutes didn’t even provide for the possibility of charging domestic 
crimes.433  Ironically, the negotiated efforts of the government of Sierra 
Leone and the United Nations to create a court that would better bridge 
international law and domestic law, compared to the ICTY and ICTR, by 
giving the SCSL specific power and authority to charge domestic crimes was 
undermined.  The Prosecutor elected to never charge domestic crimes, as a 
matter of policy.434  But the judges went even further, unjustifiably, to turn 
that policy decision of the Prosecutor into a jurisdictional exclusion of 
Article 19’s statutory provision instructing judges to consider national 
approaches to punishment, even though Article 19 is broadly applicable to all 
crimes in the court’s jurisdiction, domestic and international.  The statute 
                                                                                                                   
 428 See AFRC Sentencing Judgment. 
 429 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 27. 
 430 Id. ¶¶ 42–43. 
 431 Dana, supra note 5, at 889–97. 
 432 Id. at 896.  
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 434 See supra TABLES 1–4, at p. 631, 639, 644, 657. 
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does not limit the national sentencing law provision to domestic crimes 
only.435  Consideration of Sierra Leonean approaches to punishment was an 
opportunity to advance the sociological impact of the court’s work.  
To add insult to injury, not only were perspectives of Sierra Leone, the 
ICTR, and other African courts unworthy of mention, but the Canadian 
approach was highlighted.  In the CDF case, the SCSL judges turned to the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s definition of retribution.436  This foreign court’s 
understanding of retributive punishment was the only source of law drawn 
upon by the SCSL judges on this point and preferred over other sources, 
including Sierra Leonean authorities.437  To be clear, there is nothing unique 
or noteworthy about the Supreme Court of Canada’s definition of retribution.  
The same basic articulation can be found in legal authorities and sources 
from Sierra Leone, African scholars, and other African courts, including 
national courts, the African Court on People’s and Human Rights, and the 
ICTR.438  Given that the audience for the written judgments includes Sierra 
Leoneans, might not a greater effort to draw upon sources closer to home 
better contribute to the mandate of the court rather than promoting the views 
of a colleague from one of the international judge’s home country? 
It is amusing to observe the show and gestures involved here which 
includes not only recognition of the Supreme Court of Canada, but also 
mentions by name a particular “learned” Canadian Justice.  This approach to 
writing and reasoning judicial opinions, designed for a public audience, 
unwittingly risks giving the impression of cultural arrogance or superiority.  
One wonders what Sierra Leoneans think of it and the impression it leaves 
them, especially since the statute of court explicitly directs the judges to 
national law and practice of Sierra Leone.  Theses judges have firmly 
messaged that they are uninterested in the laws and practice of Sierra Leone 
when making their decisions.  The narrative implied here is that how the 
Europeans or Canadians do it and their views on punishment are worthy of 
mention, consideration, and adoption, but not those of Sierra Leone.   
                                                                                                                   
 435 See SCSL Statute. 
 436 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 27. 
 437 The CDF Sentencing Judgment also cites the famous English case of The Queen v. 
Dudley and Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).  In fairness, it appears to have been initially raised 
in one of the parties’ brief. 
 438 See, e.g., S. v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) (S. Afr.) (describing retribution 
as a way for society to express its outrage at the crime committed).  But see, e.g., S. v. Nkasi 
2010 (2) NAHC 33 (CC 02/2010) (12 April 2010) (Namibia High Ct.) ¶ 15 (describing 
retribution in non-revenge terms); Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, 
Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 23–24 (Mar. 14, 2005). 
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Some may question: what does it matter, especially if Sierra Leonean, or 
other African authorities, conceptualizes retribution essentially the same 
way?  From one perspective, one could argue that it does not matter, 
assuming that the more local authority understands retribution substantively 
the same way.  On the other hand, even if the concept is understood in 
legally similar ways, there remains something to be gained sociologically 
when the public judgment incorporates local laws and conceptualization of 
punishment where appropriate.  It may enhance the judgment’s social 
legitimacy.  
More importantly, the explicit incorporation of foreign authority into the 
SCSL public sentencing judgments, while at the same time ignoring local 
authority, will very likely have a negative impact on the court’s perceived 
legitimacy.  It messages to the people of Sierra Leone (and the world for that 
matter) that Canadian or western understandings are more worthy of mention 
and incorporation into international sentencing jurisprudence than Sierra 
Leone or local understanding.  Likewise, the SCSL constant blustering and 
frequent consideration of authorities from the ICTY, while at the same time 
making little reference or recognition of the ICTR judgments, sends the 
message, whether unintentionally or not, that a court sitting in Europe is 
more authoritative, and unfortunately by extension more “right,” than an 
African court.    
V.  NORMATIVE CRITIQUES OF SCSL’S SENTENCING LEGACY 
A.  Legalizing Social Narratives 
The SCSL had to struggle with what is the appropriate punishment, if 
any, for “good guys” who do very bad things in war.439  Or should we view 
them as “bad guys” who happen to be fighting for the right side?  Ian 
Fleming captured this moral conundrum in the character James Bond.  Is 
Bond a good guy who has to do bad things in order to save Queen and 
country?  Or is Bond actually a bad person who gets license to act out his 
violent impulses because he is fighting for the “right” team?  This is 
probably the most significant moral and legal question the SCSL had to face, 
and it is one that has long reaching implications for the entire enterprise of 
international criminal justice.  Many Sierra Leoneans considered the CDF 
defendants to be national heroes, in particular Samuel Hinga Norman, but 
also Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, because all three fought with, and 
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were in fact leaders within, the CDF and Kamajor forces fighting to restore a 
democratic government, its President, and constitutional institutions.440  They 
were also fighting against an evil, the RUF and AFRC, that had terrorized the 
Sierra Leonean people for a decade. 
The SCSL had found Fofana and Kondewa criminally responsible for 
very horrendous crimes of great gravity.441  When it came time to determine 
a just punishment for them, the trial judges faced a question that has been a 
persistent foe of moral philosophers: do the ends justify the means?  In the 
CDF trial, it manifested as a legal question of whether the ends justify 
mitigation of punishment, or even excuse wrongdoing.  More specifically, do 
Fofana and Kondewa deserve a reduction in their prison sentence because 
they were fighting for a “legitimate cause” as determined by SCSL judges—
some who were local Sierra Leoneans judges, other judges were foreigners?  
The trial judges answered in the affirmative, ruling that fighting for a 
legitimate cause justified mitigation of punishment even if the cause was 
achieved by committing horrendous atrocities and international crimes.   
The tone of this narrative in the sentencing judgment is often not one of 
condemnation but of redemption.  The judges speak of how fighting for the 
right side “atones” for the “grave and very serious” crimes of the CDF 
defendants.442  The judges construct a triumphant narrative around the 
criminality of the “the Accused Persons”443 who “defeated and prevailed 
over the rebellion that ousted a legitimate Government.”  They lauded the 
perpetrator’s overall conduct as an “achievement” that “contributed 
immensely to re-establishing the rule of law in this Country where 
criminality, anarchy, and lawlessness . . . had become the order of the 
day.”444  At the same time, the SCSL judges diminished the criminality, 
anarchy, and lawlessness brought on by the CDF defendants themselves.  
They further bolstered these “Accused Persons” by aligning them with the 
goals of the Organization for African Unity and the United Nations.445  
At times, the CDF trial judges further the “good guys” narrative by 
praising Norman, Fofana, and Kondewa as “selfless” heroes, making 
“supreme sacrifices.”  The Trial Chamber notes that they received national 
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 441 Norman died in custody after closing arguments but before the verdict was issued. 
 442 CDF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 87. 
 443 Interestingly, it appears that the judges prefer to use “the Accused Persons” in order to 
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awards of the highest order, but does not connect this fact to any legally 
relevant sentencing criteria.  Furthermore, from a sociological legitimacy 
perspective, it is interesting to note that the judges seem to prefer to use the 
label “the Accused Persons” in order to intentionally include Samuel Hinga 
Norman wherever their written judgment constructs a positive narrative of 
the CDF. 
Clearly, the SCSL judges in the CDF trial were mindful of the popular 
narrative surrounding Norman and the CDF fighters.  This sociological 
narrative influenced their sentence, resulting in significant reduction of the 
defendants’ penalty, and shifted the judgment’s discourse away from the 
rules that demand serious punishment for grave crimes.  On this point, the 
Appeals Chamber overruled the trial judges, holding that fighting a 
legitimate cause is not a mitigating circumstance.  Although the Appeals 
Chamber increased their sentences, this can only correct the legal error.  As 
far as the narrative is concerned, however, the bell cannot be un-rung.        
B.  Punitive Model Reorientation 
Generally speaking, international criminal tribunals, especially the ICTY, 
vacillated between punitive and restorative approaches exerting an uneven 
and unpredictable influence on sentencing allocations.446  Although the 
sentencing judgments ostensibly claimed retribution and deterrence to be the 
primary rationales influencing the severity of punishment, actual sentencing 
allocations frequently undermined both, or at a minimum, are counter-
intuitive to a punitive orientation.  Judges at the ad hoc tribunals supposedly 
positioned retribution and deterrence in pole position regarding allocating the 
appropriate amount of punishment.447  But as the judges drove laps through 
their sentencing deliberations, retribution and deterrence rarely crossed the 
finishing line first in actual influence.448  Along the way, additional 
considerations including reconciliation and record building gained ground, 
often disproportionately, diminishing the influence of punitive rationales for 
punishment of atrocity crimes.449  The ambivalence toward punitive justice is 
reflected in the ICTY’s average sentence—between sixteen and seventeen 
                                                                                                                   
 446 See Dana, supra note 338, at 62–68; see generally Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence 
and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 560–61 
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years imprisonment—for perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.450 
The SCSL re-orientates ICL sentencing towards a punitive model.  Four 
observations support this claim.  First, the SCSL consistently prioritizes 
punitive justifications for sentencing by repeatedly identifying retribution 
and deterrence as the primary purpose of sentencing for atrocity crimes.451  
Second, the SCSL judges deliberately distance themselves from restorative 
ideologies such as rehabilitation and reconciliation.452  They acknowledge 
rehabilitation as a factor in domestic criminal justice, but the SCSL judges 
consistently articulate why it is inapplicable to international criminal law.  
Third, the SCSL has rejected a number of mitigating factors that do not fit 
within a punitive framework for ICL punishment, including family 
circumstance, age, and others.  Finally, the actual sentences reveal a firmly 
punitive approach to ICL punishment, especially in comparison to the ICTY.  
The average SCSL sentence is thirty-eight years, more than double the 
sixteen years average at ICTY.453  Thus, the SCSL’s sentencing judgments 
indicate that the judges have adopted a punitive orientation to international 
criminal justice as reflected in their sentencing narratives and punishment 
allocations.  This reorientation is a positive contribution to international 
criminal law and transitional justice.  Higher penalties, and prioritizing the 
punitive approach over a restorative model toward transitional justice, may 
help explain why the SCSL enjoys greater social legitimacy than other 
international criminal tribunals.454  Punitive responses to accountability for 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes better reflect organic notions of justice.  
Moreover, the ensuing narrative becomes more consistent with our 
expectations of criminal justice mechanisms.    
There was a temporary departure from the punitive model in the sentence 
at trial of the CDF defendants.  Norman, Fofana and Kondewa were popular 
war heroes for many Sierra Leoneans.455  The dominant social narrative 
positioned them as good guys fighting for a legitimate cause, namely the 
restoration of Sierra Leone’s constitutionally elected government and 
                                                                                                                   
 450 Dana ICTY Sentencing Database (on file with author). 
 451 CDF Appeal Judgment ¶ 532; RUF Sentencing Judgment ¶ 13; Taylor Sentencing 
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president.  The Trial Chamber’s sentencing narrative reflected this popular 
narrative.  The trial judges gave legal effect to the social narrative by ruling 
that “legitimate cause” in fighting constituted a mitigating factor in 
sentencing, even where the perpetrator had committed heinous and brutal 
crimes in achieving their cause.456  Under the influence of this social 
narrative, the Trial Chamber sentenced Fofana and Kondewa to six and eight 
years imprisonment respectively.457 
The CDF Trial Chamber’s restorative ideology is manifest at every 
turning point in its sentencing analysis.  First, the judges placed rehabilitation 
on equal footing with punitive rationales of retribution and deterrence as one 
of the “primary” rationales influencing sentencing allocations.  This was 
contrary to the jurisprudence of SCSL which holds that retribution and 
deterrence are the two primary rationales to be considered when determining 
a sentence.  The SCSL judgments also consistently hold that rehabilitation is 
ill suited as a sentencing rationale for ICL punishments.458  Next, after 
adjusting the sentencing scales towards a restorative outcome, the CDF Trial 
Chamber subtly lessens the role of “gravity of the offense” in determining 
sentencing allocations.459  Whereas the ICL jurisprudence treats “gravity of 
the offense” as the primary consideration in sentencing, the CDF trial judges 
treated it as merely an “importance principle” among other important 
principles rather than treating it as the primary factor.  A restorative 
orientation continued beyond the judge’s assessment of gravity to influence 
their acceptance of an unprecedented mitigating circumstance—fight for “a 
legitimate cause.”460  The CDF perpetrators had committed crimes of 
comparable gravity to the RUF and AFRC, including murder, terrorism, 
collective punishment, and enlisting children into armed forces.461  
Nevertheless, the judges found that because the CDF defendants were 
fighting to restore the “constitutional order” of the country, their crimes 
should be assessed on a different scale for the purposes of punishment than 
that of the anti-government defendants.   
Thus, the popular social narrative of the CDF perpetrators as national 
heroes spawned legal legitimacy via judicial narratives expounded in their 
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public judgment, and ultimately, in the sentence itself.  The court justified 
very lenient sentences that appealed to the constituencies committed to this 
particular social narrative.  It first framed the purpose of ICL to capture 
rehabilitation and restorative goals as equally important as retribution and 
deterrence.  The judge then tipped the scales further towards a lenient 
punishment by lighting the punitive weight given to the gravity of the crimes.  
Finally, it anchored its low sentences by finding that leniency in punishment 
was necessitated by the unique and unprecedented mitigating factor of 
fighting for a “legitimate cause.”  In essence, the judicial narrative here 
claims that the crimes of the CDF merit lesser punishment and that the harm 
to their victims is less significant merely because the perpetrators of these 
atrocity crimes were pursuing a just cause or a just war. 
The Appeals Chamber disagreed with translating this popular narrative 
into a legally relevant mitigating factor.462  Reasserting a punitive approach 
to ICL sentencing, the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s 
holding that legitimate cause qualifies as a mitigating factor and more than 
doubled the sentence of each CDF defendant.463   
The SCSL reasserts the primary function of international criminal courts 
to determine criminal responsibility for atrocity crimes and punish 
accordingly.  This is a positive development.  Punishment is what criminal 
justice mechanisms are intended for, and thus they are inherently punitive 
and their sentences must reflect that nature.  This is not to say restorative 
processes should not form part of a broader response to atrocities.  While the 
SCSL acknowledges that prosecutions for atrocity crimes can bolster efforts 
towards reconciliation and developing a historical record, it properly limits, 
and arguably even excludes, their influence on sentence allocations.464  I do 
not discount the significance of reconciliation and an accurate historical in 
post-conflict processes.  In fact, they are arguably so important as to merit 
initiatives focused directly on achieving those goals, with independent 
institutional structures, rather than awkwardly and ineptly forcing restorative 
goals into a punitive model for responding to atrocity.  Thus, a possible 
enduring legacy of the SCSL is reorientation of international criminal justice 
mechanisms towards a punitive response to genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. 
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C.  Sentencing Framework Deficit 
While the SCSL advanced a punitive model for ICL sentencing, it failed 
to develop a sentencing framework capable of implementing this approach.  
Instead, the SCSL judges follow the general ICL practice of articulating a 
laundry list of factors relevant to sentencing under loose labels such as 
“gravity” and “aggravating and mitigating factors.”465  Yet, judges even treat 
these labels as fungible.  The absence of a viable analytical framework 
problematizes sentencing allocations and weakens the narrative force of 
international sentencing judgments.  Without a legal framework, a pattern of 
problems appears.  First, we have the problem of conceptual collapse.  
Another problem is the practice of tossing out “established principles” that 
cannot be squared with an otherwise desired sentence.   
The problem of conceptual collapse compromises the foundation of the 
SCSL’s sentencing practice.  The jurisprudence identifies four constitutive 
considerations for a just punishment: (1) gravity of the offense; (2) individual 
circumstances of the accused; (3) applicable aggravating and mitigating 
factors; and (4) where appropriate, sentencing principles found the practice 
of the ICTR and Sierra Leone.466  One positive aspect of the SCSL’s 
sentencing practice is that the judges consistently, in all their judgments, 
articulate these four considerations, which are found in the court’s 
constitutive legal texts, as relevant for determining of a fair sentence.  The 
problem is that they do not follow it.  Judges collapse the second and third 
into a single consideration.  All SCSL sentencing judgments do this.467  The 
category of “individual circumstances of the accused” becomes a dumping 
ground for “aggravating and mitigating factors.”  This deprives the judges of 
a tool to make sentencing distinctions when needed while maintaining 
consistency in the desired narrative.   
Unfortunately, the collapsing of important concepts does not stop there.  
They also blur the conceptual significance and distinction between “gravity” 
and “aggravating factors.”  Separate, but related, is the judicial obsession to 
narrate everything in terms of “gravity.”  Thus, the concept of “gravity of the 
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offense”—the championed “litmus test” for a fair sentence—has become a 
dumping ground for a wide range of factors, even ones that have a distinct 
home elsewhere, such as “aggravating” factors.  The lack of intellectual rigor 
and legal analysis is comforted with caveats that double counting will be 
avoided.  Just punishment and fair sentencing is no longer a disciplined legal 
exercise of judgment, but a gut check emotion.  Emotive sentencing is 
always dangerous, but particularly so in international criminal justice where 
the context giving rise to the defendant’s trial is likely to be gruesome and 
well publicized.   
Another consequence of an insufficient sentencing framework is the ease 
by which purported “established principles” are cast aside without 
meaningful explanation.  For example, Professor Heller observes that after 
adopting the position that aiding and abetting warrants a shorter sentence, the 
Taylor Trial Chamber summarily swept it aside.468  The SCSL judges often 
proffer a principle in an attempt to frame their sentencing decisions, but do 
not actually follow them in practice.  The practice suggests that either there 
is no sentencing framework, or what is there is insufficient to cope with the 
complexities of atrocity criminality.  The failure of the SCSL to develop a 
workable sentencing framework is a shortcoming in its legacy.   
In a separate article, I propose a comprehensive legal framework for ICL 
sentencing.469  In doing so, I clarify and re-conceptualize concepts at the core 
of understating culpability for atrocities crimes, including gravity, modes of 
liability, and the role of the accused.  I also advance an original theory for 
ICL, called “enabler responsibility,” which is both explanatory and 
instructive.  The enabler responsibility theory posits that, when sentencing, 
international judges factor in the accused’s responsibility or role, if any, for 
creating, maintaining, and/or sustaining the situation or environment for 
mass atrocity criminality.  These perpetrators enable an environment that 
normalizes or encourages criminal wrongdoing on a large scale.  I argue that 
enabler responsibility influences the sentence, especially of atrocity 
perpetrators at the very top of the hierarchy, even if unarticulated as a factor.  
Although neither the SCSL nor the general ICL sentencing jurisprudence 
explicitly identifies enabler responsibility as a distinct sentencing factor, the 
notion is often present in judicial narratives.470   
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The “enabler responsibility” theory closes the explanatory gap in 
sentencing judgments, including Charles Taylor’s punishment.  Some 
commentators argue that Taylor’s fifty year sentence is excessive given the 
fact he was guilty of merely aiding and abetting in the crimes.471  A closer 
examination of the judgment however reveals that the judges consider Taylor 
to have not merely aided and abetted in the crimes but in fact enabled the 
atrocities.472  Thus, the SCSL viewed Taylor as an enabler of the atrocities in 
Sierra Leone and the sentencing outcome—fifty years imprisonment—
suggests that the judges consider enabler responsibility to merit a high 
sentence.  However, in their sentencing judgment, the judges do not revisit 
the “enabler” narrative.  Taylor’s enabler responsibility is a crucial dynamic 
of his criminality that solidly justifies their relatively more severe 
punishment of Taylor.  Accordingly, the enabler responsibility theory also 
offers a pathway towards congruency between judicial sentencing narratives 
and actual punishment allocations.  It is also instructive to future sentencing 
determinations by the ICC and other international tribunals. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This year marks the twenty-first anniversary of the re-birth of 
international criminal justice and accountability for atrocity crimes.  Two 
years ago marked the tenth anniversary of the International Criminal Court 
and The Special Court for Sierra Leone.  There has been a proliferation of 
international criminal courts and tribunals of many varieties; likewise, 
academic scholarship on the subject has steadily grown.  The notion of 
international justice holds a hope and promise like no other.  It also 
aggravates and frustrates its supporters, much less its critics, like no other.  
As this nascent firmament on the horizon of international justice gains 
footing, it is important that components fundamental to its success are 
nurtured and developed.  Justice in punishment is essential.  Equally so are 
the narratives that sentencing judgments construct about justice, human 
nature, and conflict.  Thus, ICL sentencing jurisprudence must live up to 
both, and it can only do so if it is anchored by a coherent framework and 
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driven by sound theory.  It is with the hope of contributing to the maturation 
of the law of sentencing in international criminal justice that this contribution 
is offered.   
The SCSL contributed some important rulings that international lawyers 
and scholars will long continue to examine.  Some novel features include the 
trial and punishment of a (former) Head of State; the consideration of 
exterritorial criminality as an aggravating factor; and mitigating the 
punishment of atrocity perpetrators on the ground that they were fighting for 
a legitimate cause.  The latter holding did not survive on appeal but the 
narrative may still survive for historians seeking to understand the conflict.  
One positive contribution with potential to serve as lasting legacy is the 
SCSL’s reorientation of international criminal justice toward a punitive 
model in response to atrocities.  It remains to be seen whether this punitive 
reorientation is followed by other international judges, especially at the ICC.  
Additionally, the SCSL’s narrative surrounding Charles Taylor’s criminality 
opens the door to exploration of a crucial dynamic that international criminal 
law has ignored or underrepresented in its judicial narratives: perpetrators 
who are enablers of atrocities.  
For its many positive contributions to the ICL, the judges of the SCSL 
failed to give adequate attention to advancing ICL sentencing law.  No 
meaningful sentencing framework is constructed and the general practice of 
unarticulated sentencing judgments by international judges continues.  This 
Article aimed to draw out the key contributions of SCSL to the law of 
sentencing in ICL and to provide some normative assessments of the SCSL’s 
legacy.  The SCSL sentencing jurisprudence provides a rich and fertile 
landscape upon which to build a coherent ICL sentencing framework and 
theory.  It is with the hope of stimulating debate and discourse on both that 
this contribution is offered. 
